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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST NATIONAL BANK IN 
GRAND JUNCTIO~. a National 
Banking Association, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
RALPH OSBORNE and 
JIM L. HUDSON, 
Defendants and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
12804 
STATEl\IENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Plaintiff brought this action on a promissory note 
and loan guaranty agreement after acceleration of the 
payment date and nonpayment of the principal amount 
of $60,000.00 and interest. 
I 
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT 
At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence 
the trial court took the case from the jury and directed 
a verdict for plaintiff. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant Jim L. Hudson seeks to reverse the 
judgment against him and the rulings of the trial court 
in refusing to admit offered cv'clence and in directing 
the verdict for plaintiff. 
STA'l'ElHEXT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal by Defendant Hudson from i 
directed verdict for Plaintiff First X ational Bank ir 
Grand Junction. The action was brought by that banl 
against Ralph Os borne and Hudson to collect on a prom 
issory note signed by Osborne alone and a separate loat 
guaranty agreement on which there appears a signaturt 
"Jim L. Hudson." Hudson testified that the signaturt 
on the guaranty agreement looks like his signature and 
if it is it does not "belong on this piece of paper or in a 
bank in Grand Junction." He testified, further, that ht 
never knowingly signed the guaranty agreement whicl 
is dated June 3, 1969; that the first time he saw it anc 
the first time he knew that a loan had been made by tht 
2 
Grand Junction bank to Osborne was in April, 1970, 
when representatives of that bank telephoned him and 
then made a trip to lHoab to advise him that they were 
accelerating payment under the note; that he never re-
ceived any of the money loaned to Osborne and was 
never contacted by the Grand Junction bank or by any 
one else with reference to the loan prior to said date in 
April, 1970. The loan in question was granted to Os-
borne on June 6, 1969. (R. 58, 59) A handwriting ex-
, pert expressed the opinion at the trial that the signature 
' on the loan guaranty agreement is genuine. 
Osborne consented to the entry of a default judg-
ment against him. He did not appear at the trial, his at-
torney would not produce him for the taking of his depo-
sition and he was absent and beyond the jurisdiction. (R. 
189) Hudson denied liability and demanded a jury trial. 
'\Then the parties rested the District Court took the case 
away from the jury and entered a directed verdict for 
Plaintiff in the principal sum of $60,000.00 plus interest 
of $8,328.66 and costs and expenses and attorney fees in 
the amount of $16,707.29. 
At the time the Grand Junction bank loaned Os-
borne the $60,000.00-J une 6, 1969-0sborne was the 
executive vice president of the Moab National Bank of 
Moab, Utah. That bank was a "correspondent bank" of 
the Plaintiff First National Bank in Grand Junction. 
Under a "correspondent bank" relationship, among other 
things, the smaller bank, in this instance the Moab Na-
tional Bank, clears its checks through the "big brother" 
3 
bank, First National Hank in Grand Junction, and if 
smaller bank is asked to make loans in excess of its lei 
limit it seeks to place the excess portions of the loans w 
the larger bank. 
.Mr . .Jam es \ V .. Mackley, a vice president and a le 
officer of the First National Bank in Grand J uncti1 
who handled the loan in question, was also its correspo1 
ent bank representative. \Vhile acting in that capac 
he would visit correspondent banks, including .Moab ~ 
tional Uank, from two to four times a year. During st 
visits to .Moab National Bank he became acquainl 
with Osborne, the executive officer of that bank. ( R. 1 
Mr. Mackley testified that in the latter part of M: 
1969, Osborne telephone him from )loab and stated tl 
he wanted to borrow $tiO,OOO.OO; that he (Mackley) 
viewed financial statements Osborne had given I 
Grand Junction bank in connection with several mt: 
smaller prior loans never exceeding $3500.00, and 
then advised Osborne that he would not be able to me; 
the loan; that in a subsequent conversation Osbm 
stated "that he would offer a co-signer," and that at so: 
point he said the co-signer would be .Jim L. Hudson,~ 
lived in Moab. ( R. 129) :Mackley also testified as f 
lows: 
That at the time Osborne mentioned Hudso 
name he (.Mackley) did not know Hudson, or anythi 
about him; that he told Osborne he would need a fin: 
cial statement from Hudson. (R. 129-130) 
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That Osborne mailed Mackley a financial statement 
a which Hudson had furnished and addressed to the Moab 
t' National Hank in connection with an entirely different 
matter according to Hudson (R. 59-63) dated June l, 
1969, and signed an<l witnessed June 2, 1969, (Plain-
1 tiff's Exhibit No. 2); that on June 3, 1969, Mackley 
'f wrote Osborne acknowledging receipt of Hudson's fi-
e nancial statement and "enclosing note for your signa-
l ture and that of Jim L. Hudson." (Defendant's Exhibit 
i No. 28) ( R. 133) In this letter Mackley wrote that he 
c would need a current financial statement from Osborne 
e in support of the loan. 
l 
On the front and back of the printed note form 
1; Mackley sent to Osborne (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3) the 
1< following had been typewritten: "Unsee. Co-signed Jim 
't L. Hudson." On the bank's ledger sheet pertaining to 
n this loan (Defendant's Exhibit .No. 21) the following 
c had been typed: "Co-signed by: Jim L. Hudson." The 
~promissory note form used also had a signature line for 
\a guarantor. Osborne did not obtain Hudson's signature 
1 on the note, as Mackley had requested in his letter. The 
r only signature on the note was Osborne's. (R. 134) 
l \\Then .Mr. :Mackley was asked whether he did any-
o • 
thing to verify the accuracy of Hudson's financial state-
ment he replied: "I cannot remember exactly what steps 
n I did take. I know that I satisfied myself that it was valid 
1 and proceeded to grant the loan." 'Vhen asked whether 
11 he was implying that he did take some steps to verify the 
financial statement he replied: 
s 
"A. I am saying that I can·t remember at th 
point in time what I might have done to verify i 
l would like to say this, in my deposition given I 
the court a year ago in October, I stated that 
called the, l think my words were that I callt 
the credit bureau. 1 have subsequently-the cred 
bureau in Moab. I have subsequently checked 01 
telephone record. I made a spontaneous stateme1 
that day that I have been unable to verify. I ca1 
not state at this time that I did check with cl 
credit bureau. In checking our own records of ti 
bank, the telephone billing, the billing from ti 
credit bureau I can find no record of that ai 
therefore I cannot say at this time that I checkt 
with them. I am saying only that I satisfied rn 
self that it was a valid statement. I cannot sta 
what those sources were." ( R. 134-135) 
When questioned further as to what he might have do1 
to satisfy himself of the validity of the financial stat 
ment he testified: 
"A. Mr. Saperstein, when dealing with bas 
ally people who you have dealt with over a peri1 
of time and you, there are certain things that y 
rely on when you are dealing with one bank of 
cer to another and these things are, you are de 
ing in a little different position than you do wh 
you are dealing with people that are entirely t 
known to you." ( R. 135) 
Mr .. Mackley's deposition was published at the requi 
of counsel for Defendant Hudson, and Mackley : 
knowledged he had testified that in handling Osborn 
request he did the "normal things that we would 
through in trying to ascertain whether or not we co1 
grant a loan or virtually the same as we would do w 
6 
hanybody in spite of the fact that Ralph was a loan officer 
' 1himself. And certainly aware of the routine that we fol-
1t1lowed." ( R. 136) 
:~ .Mr .. Mackley also testified that at the time his depo-
Jusition was taken the only thing he told counsel that he 
e1did to verify the financial statement of Mr. Hudson was 
aito call the credit bureau, and that when he was testifying 
~at the trial he could not remember anything else that he 
~tdid. (R. 138) 
in Mr. Mackley testified while under examination by 
~~counsel for Defendant Hudson that on April 6, 1970, 
:aisome nine or ten months after the loan was made, he tele-
phoned 1"Ir. Hudson in Moab; that that was the first 
orcontact he had had with Mr. Hudson and the first time 
1t1he had talked with him; and that his motivation in call-
ing Mr. Hudson at that time was because he had heard 
.that Ralph Osborne was leaving the Moab National 
'~ 11Bank. ( R. 155-156) He also identified a copy of a letter 
~~e wrote to Mr. Osborne on June 23, 1970, (Defendant's 
,fJExhibit No. 27). (R. 156) At that time Mr. Osborne 
eawas in Malibu Beach, California. Mackley's letter was as 
hf.follows: 
UI 
)U 
.vi 
"Dear Ralph: 
"I was planning to reach you earlier today and I 
find that you and your family apparently left 
Moab yesterday. I am writing you to request that 
you call me collect as soon as possible. I'm not 
certain exactly what is going to happen in our 
case with Hudson, but I would certainly appreci-
ate it if you would take the time to call me and 
7 
answer a few questions that could assist me grea 
ly in bringing this case in our favor. 
"I'm certain that yuzt can appreciate the positit 
that I arn in at this time, and I hope that .lJOU tCi 
feel inclined to cooperate with me in this matte 
(Emphasis added) 
Very truly yours, 
Jam es W. Mackle1 
Yice President" · 
Counsel for Defendant H nelson called as a witne· 
l\ilrs. :Mabel Stengal, owner and manager of the Cred 
Bureau of l\loab who testified that her records did Ill 
disclose any inquiries from the First ~ ati1mal Bank· 
Grand .T unction or any billings to that bank about ti 
financial responsibility of l\lr. Hudson. Counsel for ti 
Grand .Junction hank stipulated that her records "woul 
so show that she didn't have any billings or any [ 
quiries." (R. 167) 
'Vhen Osborne returned the promissory note whil 
he alone had signed, he also included a printed form Lo: 
Guaranty Agreement on which there is an unwitnesst 
signature "Jim L. Hudson." (Plaintiff's Exhibit ~ 
l) . When asked whether he contacted ::\Ir. II udson pri1 
to disbursing the $60,000.00, l\fr. Mackley testified th 
he attempted one phone call only to Hudson which l 
did not complete; never called him again, nor even wro 
him. He testified that he compared the signature on tl 
loan guaranty with Hudson's witnessed signature on ti 
financial statement ( R. 140) ; that it is not his practice 
either meet with or in any fashion contact out of to11 
8 
reaguarantors to verify the guarantee, even if the guarantor 
is unknown, so long as he (Mackley) is satisfied every-
ritic thing is in order; that he couldn't presently recall what 
~ tv1steps he took to so satisfy himself. (R. 142-145) 
1tte 
s \Vhen aske<l how the funds were disbursed, Mr. 
1
, Mackley testified that the proceeds of the loan were dis-
{~ h • · bursed directly to or for t e benefit of Osborne and that 
none of the proceeds were disbursed to Hudson. (R. 
141) 
tne~ 
red \"Tith reference to the Grand Junction bank's nor-
i Ill mal practice of not arranging meetings, face to face, with 
nk; out-of-town guarantors, Mr. Mackley testified as fol-
1t ti lows: 
>r tl 
voul 
y li 
:vhil 
Lrn 
1ess1 
t ~ 
pn1 
!th 
ch l 
wro 
rn tl 
)Il tl 
tice 
t011 
"Q. Now, :Mr. :Mackley, did you at any time 
ever request that .Mr. Osborne arrange a meeting 
face to face with you and Mr. Hudson prior to 
the disbursement of any of these funds? 
"A. No, sir, this is not normally done. 
"Q. Not normally done in your bank? 
"A. \Vhere the party is out of town we norm-
ally don't put the borrower to that- I don't know 
the word I'm looking for. \Ve normally don't do 
that when we are dealing with out of town bor-
rowers. * * * * 
"Q. Now did you ever contact-I will go back 
to that, you said that it wasn't the practice to do it, 
that is true even if the guarantor is completely un-
known to you you never want to sit down and 
meet with him and verify that guarantee even if 
he is unknown to you, is that true? 
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"A. There might be circumstances that \\ 
would make an exception, but basically I woul 
say that is true." (R. 142-143) 
Mr .. Mackley, while under examination by couns1 
for Defendant Hudson, testified that he did not advh 
the loan committee of his bank about the loan to Osborn 
because "there was no reason to." In answer to a que! 
tion whetht.:r he advised the board of directors of t1 
Grand Junction bank about the loan he answered: "Tb 
directors review these loans on a periodic basis." \Vhe 
asked whether he advised any other officer or agent 1 
the bank about the loan prior to disbursing the funds h 
answered: "I cannot swear that I did, no." Asked whetl 
er he could swear that he did not, he answered that Ii 
didn't recall, and then testified: 
"A. As a matter of fact the president of OL 
bank says that he was fully aware of the loan pri1 
to my granting it. I frankly do not remember di 
cussing it with him, but he ~ays that he knew a 
about it and was aware of it prior to the date th: 
it was disbursed. I do not remember.'' (R. 149) 
The answer of the President of the Grand J unctic 
bank, George B. McKinley, to an interrogatory sul 
mitted by counsel for Dcf endant Hudson was publishe1 
The interrogatory and the answer read into the recor 
are: 
Interrogatory: "\Vho participated in the di 
cision to make the loan alleged in your complaint 
Answer: "The decision to makt the loan wt 
made solely by James \V. Mackley." (R. 161) 
Mr. McKinley did not testify at the trial. 
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\\ The handwriting expert, l\fr. John J. Harris, of 
ul Los Angeles, California, called by counsel for Plaintiff, 
testified that the signature on the Loan Guaranty Agree-
1s1 • d l . . f . ment was a genume an aut ientic signature of De end-
1~ ant Hudson, based upon his comparison of that signa-
:n ture with testament signatures presented to him as the 
e! authentic writing of ~Ir. Hudson. (R. 28) He also testi-
:h fied that he had compared typewritten exemplars taken 
h from typewriters in the First National Bank in Grand 
e Junction and in the :Moab National Bank with type-
1' written material in the Loan Guaranty Agreement 
h (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. I) and the promissory note 
l executed by Osborne (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3). Mr. 
11 Harris testified that the following typewritten words 
and figures appearing in the first paragraph of the Loan 
L Guaranty Agreeme11t are the same type as on exemplars 
1 he received of words and figures typewritten on type-
: writers in the .Moab National Bank: 
I 
"Ralph Osborne .Moab, Utah First National 
Bank, Grand Junction, Colo. Sixty Thousand 
and ---------------no/IOO." ( R. 33) 
Further, he testified that the word and figures "3rd 
June, 1969" in the last two lines of the Loan Guaranty 
Agreement are the same type as found on the typewriters 
found in the Moab National Bank. (R. 33) He also test-
ified that the words "Colorado" and "Grand Junction, 
Colorado" which are written in blanks in the sixth para-
graph and in the last two lines of the Loan Guaranty 
Agreement compare with the exemplar he had received 
of material typewritten on a typewriter in the Grand 
11 
Junction bank. ( R. 41) He concluded that the typewr: 
ing on the promissory note (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. ; 
mailed to Mackley by Osborne is the same style of ty1 
or font as the typewriting on the exemplar from the Fir 
National Hank in Grand Junction. (R. 41) .Mr. Mac~ 
ley testified that while he did not recall, it was "ve1 
possible" that the words "Colorado" and "Grand Jun 
tion, Colorado'' were added by the secretary in his offi 
to the Loan Guaranty Agreement after it was receiY1 
from Osborne and "prior to filing." (R. 149) 
Defendant .Tim L. Hudson testified that he mai 
tained a small checking account with the l\'loab Nation 
Bank and that it was through his business with that bar 
that he became acquainted with Osborne; that startii 
in 1968 he bought some certificates of deposit at th 
bank; and on one occasion he cashed some of the certil 
cates of deposit before their due date. In this connectir 
he testified as follows: 
"Q. Did you have those redeemed or cashed 
by the bank? 
"A. I think they were for a ninety day period 
I recall, and I let them run ninety days and 
think I received my interest and something can 
up after that and I went and cashed the savin. 
certificates before another ninety days was up. : 
"Q. I see, and who cashed those in for you 
behalf of the bank? 
"A. Ralph Osborne. 
"Q. Where did this particular transaction ta' 
place? 
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"A. At his desk. * * * 
"Q. Now at the time that you cashed those time 
certificates of deposit did you sign any document 
that you recall? 
"A. I know I signed something. 
"Q. Did you have any conversation with Mr. 
Osborne with respect to cashing in these time cer-
tificates of deposit? * * * 
"A. Yes. Did we have a conversation. 
"Q. 'Vith respect to the fact that you were 
cashing in the time certificates ? 
"A. I would not be able to draw interest on the 
note, on the savings certificate for this period. 
I'd have to forego I think it was about half way 
through the ninety days, the second ninety days 
or so, and I would have to give up my interest 
from the beginning of the period till-* * * 
"Q. Did he present any document to you for 
your signature relating to this question of interest 
if you recall? * * * 
"A. I know I was required to sign something. 
"Q. You don't recall what it was? 
"A. Not exactly." (R. 51-54) 
Counsel showed l\Ir. Hudson Plaintiff's Exhibit 
No. 2, a financial statement signed by him on June 2, 
1969, one day before the date of the loan guaranty agree-
ment. Mr. Hudson acknowledged that he signed the fi-
nancial statement. He then testified as follows: 
"Q. All right, sir. Now prior to the date that 
this financial statement bears, have you had any 
13 
discussion relative to that financial staternen 
with Ralph Osborne?* * * 
"A. Yes, in the bank in the Moab N ationa 
Bank at Moab. 
"Q. And who was present at that time? 
"A. Torn Stocks and myself with Ralph o~ 
borne. 
"Q. What was the occasion for your being ii 
the Moab National Bank on that date? 
"A. He said he had something he wanted 1, 
talk to me about. * * * 
"Q. When? 
"A. This would have been probably about, i 
was-
"Q. When, with respect to the date this finan 
cial stater11c:nt b'-ars, maybe lhat would help you 
"A. Probably a week or ten days before. 
"Q. I see. How did the invitation take place? 
"A. I believe he called on the phone. * * * 
"Q. Where did this conversation with Mr. n 
borne take place at the bank? 
"A. Partially upstairs and .Mr. Osborne invitei 
us down to the basement. * * * 
"Q. Will you tell us what Mr. Osborne said 11 
you at that time? 
"A. He said that Mr. McCormick who own 
the bank in :Moab was getting old and his heal! 
was bad and he wanted to possibly sell the bani 
And said my name had come up several time 
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with other directors that I might purchase some 
interest in the bank or stock. 
"Q. Now was this McCormick's stock in the 
bank? 
"A. l presume that is what he was talking 
about. 
"Q. I see. \Vas Mr. J\11cCormick the president 
of the bank at the time? 
"A. He was president of the bank at that time. 
"Q. All right, what else was said? Do you recall 
whether there was any discussion about price of 
the stock? 
"A. Yes, and I told him I didn't have that kind 
of money that what it would take to buy that up, 
and he said this could be arranged through an-
other bank in Grand Junction. 
"Q. Did he name the bank in Grand Junction? 
"A. He named the United States Bank in 
Grand Junction is what he named. 
"Q. And what else did he say in connection 
with that? 
"A. That this bank would be made, if this could 
be arranged that the money could be borrowed 
from the United States Bank over there, and the 
bank would loan it if they would make the Moab 
National Bank the corresponding bank. What-
ever that is. 
"Q. I see. Did Mr. Osborne indicate to you 
what interest he had in this transaction? 
"A. I think it was indicated that he would like 
to retain his position in the bank. 
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"Q. In the .Moab National Bank? 
"A. In the Moab National Bank. 
"Q. I see. All right, and what else was said tha 
you recall? 'Vas there any discussion at that tiru 
with respect to this financial statement? 
"A. Yes there was. He needed a financial statt 
ment on me. The bank wanted one. The Moa 
National Bank I d ne,·er gJYe them one and l1 
done some business there. 
"Q. Did Osborne tell you that at that time? 
"A. He wanted a financial statement. The ban 1 
wanted one. The .Moab National Bank, I guei 
the other directors and things would want to st , 
what I was. 
"Q. 'Vhat did you say? 
"A. I said I would have Mr. Stocks fix one U[ , 
* * * 
"Q. All right, and was a financial statemen 
then prepared by Mr. Stocks for your signature 
"A. Yes it was. 
"Q. And the financial statement, what I shm1 
ed you earlier that has been received in evidenc 
here, is that document, is that correct? 
"A. That is true. * * * 
"Q. How, .Mr. Hudson, after this financi< 
statement was prepared did you deliver that t 
Mr. Osborne? 
"A. No, Tom Stocks delivered it to Ralph 0 
borne. 
"Q. Did you ever have any subsequent convt1 
sation with Mr. Osborne after this financial stati 
ment was delivered to him? 
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"A. Yes, I saw him a month or so later. I asked 
him how that deal was coming along we talked 
about. And he said l\Ir. McCormick recovered 
his health and wasn't interested in selling the 
bank any more. 
"Q. Did you ever have any further conversation 
with him about that stock acquisition? 
"A. None whatsoever." (R. 60-64) 
.Mr. Hudson testified that prior to the time two rep-
resentatives of the First National Bank in Grand J unc-
tion came to :Moab to see him, which was in April, 1970, 
.Mr. Mackley called him by telephone and told him they 
were going to accelerate the Osborne loan. Mr. Hudson 
replied that he was not on any loan with Ralph Osborne, 
and Mackley then said he was going to come to Moab 
with his attorney. l\Ir. Hudson said he then called his 
attorney in Salt Lake City, and that before the repre-
sentatives of the Grand Junction bank arrived in Moab 
Ralph Osborne called him by telephone and wanted to 
know if he could come to his office and talk with him. 
(R. 64-65) Hudson's further testimony was as follows: 
"Q. 'Ve have got to the point I believe, Mr. 
Hudson, prior to the objection when the jury was 
excused. After the telephone call and where Mr. 
Osborne had arrived at the office, and I believe 
you testified that when he came in Mr. Stocks and 
you were present at that time, is that correct? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Then I believe you also said that Mr. 
Stocks left, is that correct? 
"A. He was asked to leave, yes. 
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[At p. u8 of the Hecord ~Ir. Hudson identifie1 
Osborne as the one who asked Tom to leave th 
room.] 
"Q. All right, now after .l\Ir. Stocks left tha 
just left you and .l\Ir. Osborne in the room tc 
gether, is that correct? 
"A. Yes.*** 
"Q. 'Vhat did .Mr. Osborne say to you at thi 
time and what did you say to him? 
"A. \Vell, he asked me if the bank had callt 
me from Graud .Junction. I said yes. He-
"Q. \Vhat did you say to him 1 
"A. I asked him why he would do such a thini 
1 
"Q. What did you say to him? 'Vhat did yo : 
say, give us the words as closely as you can rt 
member, l\1r. Hudson? 
" 
"A. I said, Ralph what in the world ever po~ 1 
sessed you to do such a thing as that. 
( 
"Q. \Vhat did he say? 
"A. He said, well set there and see all thi 1 
money going by and eyery day and everybod ~ 
getting some but me. 
"Q. 'Vas there anything further said? 
"A. Yes, he wanted to know if we couldn 
work something out. If I couldn't buy some clairn 
off him or something that would pay this thin 
off. \Ve didn't have nothing to discuss. 
"Q. 'Vas there anything further said aftt 
that? 
"A. You mean at a different time or right ther1 
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"Q. No, during that conversation, included in 
that conversation. 
"A. Well, he mentioned something that he'd 
come up with half of the money, that he'd sell me 
some claims for the other half or anything. * * * 
"Q. During the period of time that you were 
acquainted with Mr. Osborne had you ever had 
any personal business relationship with him on a 
personal basis other than as he might have been 
appearing in a representative capacity for the 
bank? 
"A. None." (R. 76-78) 
Mr. Thomas A. Stocks was called as a witness for 
~ the Defendant Hudson. He testified that he did Mr. 
1 Hudson's accounting work, and that he and Mr. Hudson 
t jointly own the building where they have their offices. 
He testified that on April 6, 1970, when Osborne came 
·~ to his office Osborne asked him if he and Mr. Hudson 
could use his office. At that time he left his office and 
was not present when .Mr. Hudson and Mr. Osborne had 
u their conversation. He said that he was present when 
1 Osborne had his conversation with Mr. Hudson in May, 
1969 about acquiring stock in the Moab National Bank. 
When asked to relate that conversation he testified: 
"A. And he told Jim and I that he was con-
cerned about, or he wanted to know if Jim was 
interested in buying some stockholder's interest 
in the bank because he, Bill McCormick was old 
and not feeling well and that he was contemplat-
ing starting a bank in Roosevelt when he felt 
would be denied by the Banking Commission and 
he felt that Mr. McCormick would be willing to 
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sell his stock if he didn t get the bank up in Hoos1 < 
velt. And would Jim be interested in acqrnriu . 
that stock, and if so he went on to say that if Ju 1 
didn't have the funds that he could arrange fl ' 
some low interest money from the U. S. Bank i ( 
Grand Junction, Colorado, at some six per cer ~ 
interest. Six and a half. 1 
"Q. All right, what else was said at that turn r 
"A. He said that, he said that he would need l 
financial statement from Jim and Jim said you ~ 
have to talk to him about that and Jim left U I 
room and Osborne said to me, we should get sorn ( 
of this low interest money and buy some stock toi t 
and I said I don't want any stock, I need H 
money to buy groceries, not stock." ( R. 17 5-176 : 
.. 
. Mr. Stocks prepared the financial statement and took , 
to .Mr. Osborne. Under cross examination he stated th, t 
Mr. Osborne told him that Mr. McCormick might l < 
willing to dispose of his stock at any time, and that ti 1 
occasion might cume suddenly. ( R. 177) 
Counsel for the defendant Hudson sought to intrr < 
duce evidence to show that the purpose for which tl c 
loan was made awl the use to \vhich $45,000.00 of tl ' 
proceeds of the loan were put by Osborne was to cover 1 
I 
series of outstanding unrecorded certificates of depos · 
previously issued and sold by Osborne in behalf of tl 1 
Moab National Bank, the proceeds of which had bet 
embezzled by Osborne. This evidence was excluded t c 
the court as irrelevant and it was made the subject of 1 
formal offer of proof. (R. 112-120). The proffer crn 1 
sisted of the proposed testimony of Martha Dohse, tl : 
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cashier of the .Moab National Hank, who conducted an 
investigation and inspection of the records of that bank 
when it became known in .May of 1970 that Ralph 
Osborne, one of its executive officers, had borrowed 
$60,000.00 from the Plaintiff Bank one year earlier. (R. 
116) As a result of her investigation .Mrs. Dohse deter-
mined that thret: certificates of deposit had been issued 
by the Bank, for which there was no record; that 
$45,000.00 of the proceeds of Osborne's loan with the 
plaintiff was credited to the certificates of deposit ledger 
of the Moab Bank; and that the three unrecorded cer-
. tificates of deposit were redeemed or renewed after June 
: 10, 1969, by the holders thereof and totalled $45,000.00. 
All underlying documents to which she referred were 
offered in evidence in support of Mrs. Dohse's proposed 
' testimony. In addition counsel offered an exemplified 
I copy of the indictment issued by the United States Dis-
i trict Court for the District of Utah in the criminal case 
of "United States of America vs. Ralph Osborne," 
1 charging Osborne with embezzlement of the funds re-
[ ceived in exchange for each of the said three certificates 
l of deposit and an exemplified copy of the minute entry 
r recording Osborne's plea of guilty thereto. (R. ll8) 
s Said offer of proof is set out in full in the appendix here-
} to. 
:e Counsel for defendant Hudson also sought to intro-
\ duce evidence of a conversation occurring in April, 1970, 
f between Osborne and the witness, 'Villiam S. May, an-
11 other employee of the Moab National Bank. May testi-
tl! fied in the absence of the jury as follows: 
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"Q. \Vho else was present 1 
"A. No one .. Myself and l\Ir. Osborne. Th 
statement he made at that time was to the effec\ 
well I might as well tell you about it, you'll kno1, 
about it anyway. I asked him what he meant, an 
he said there was an unlisted loan at the First Na 
tional Bank in the amount of Sixty Thousani 
dollars. 
"Q. First National Bank of what? 
"A. First National Bank of Grand J unctior 
And I never thought too much about it one wa' 
or another, and I asked him how the loan corn 
about and he said that Jim Hudson guarantee, 
the loan. And he said, that 1 finally was able t 
hang one in him. I've been laying for him fo 
some time and I finally got the chance to do i; 
And that was about the extent of the conversatio; 
that afternoon." (R.108) 
The court excluded this as immaterial and as hear 
say. (R. 111-112) 
Counsel for defendant Hudson also sought to elic1 
the opinion of J olm M. Chatelain, Senior Examiner o 
the Utah Department of Financial Institutions and: 
qualified witness (R. 190-192) for the purpose of estao 
lishing that the conduct of James ,V . .:\Iackley in makin: 
the loan to Osborne was neither prudeut nor in conform 
ity with reasonable commercial standards of the bani 
ing industry. In the absence of the jury, Mr. Chatelair 
based upon counsel's hypothetical question, expresse 
his opinion that 1\Iackley's conduct was neither that of a 
ordinary prudent banker nor was it in conformity wit 
reasonable commercial standards in the banking ii 
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dustry. He further testified that in order to conform to 
such standards :Mackley should have made contact with 
Hudson, preferably in person, but in any event under 
' circumstances that Mackley knew that the person with 
whom he spoke was Hudson, inasmuch as he was un-
known to Mackley and the loan was made on the basis of 
the guarantee. (R. 194-199). This testimony was ex-
cluded as irrelevant. (R. 201). 
Each of the foregoing offers of proof are set out in 
' the Appendix hereto. 
ARGUNIENT 
The trial Court took the case from the jury and di-
1 rected a verdict for plaintiff after hearing the evidence 
received, and after hearing offers of proof as to evidence 
which the Court refused to admit. In Point V of this 
Argument we discuss the error of the trial Court in con-
cluding that the evidence when viewed in the light most 
favorable to defendant Hudson, discloses no genuine 
issue as to any material fact. In Points I, II, III, and 
J IV we take up the rulings of the trial Court ref using to 
receive offered evidence and point out questions which 
should have been submitted to the jury, after which, we 
believe, the error of the Court in directing the verdict 
will be all the more evident. 
POINT I. 
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO 
n REFUSE TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OFFERED 
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BY APPELLANT THAT OSBORNE USE! 
$45,000.00 OF THE llORROYVED ~IONEY T( 
REPLACE i\IONEY OSBORNE HAD PRE 
YIOUSLYDIYEHTED TO HIS O\VN PERSON 
AL USE AND BENEFIT FR0.1\1 THE "CER'l'J 
FICATES OF DEPOSIT'' ACCOUNT OF THJ 
MOAB NATIONAL BANK. 
At the trial :Mackley testified that upon approva 
of the loan to Osborne the $60,000.00 was disbursed b! 
issuing a credit memo, dated June 6, 19669, to the Moa! 
National Bank, of which Osborne was the executive offi 
cer. 'Vritten across the face of the credit memo was th 
following: "Ralph Osborne Note." (Defendant's Ex 
hibit No. 30). 
\Vhen counsel for defendant Hudson sought to in 
troduce evidence as to what Osborne did with the bor 
rowed money, however, the Court sustained Plaintiff' 
objections to the testimony. The following is a brie 
resume of the offer of proof made by counsel for defend 
ant Hudson: 
Counsel for defendant Hudson identified a 
being in Court .l\Irs .. Margaret Dohse, Cashier o 
the :Moab National Bank. He also identifie1 
through Mrs. Dohse certain records of the Moal 
bank which she had brought with her to the Cour 
room. He stated that the offered testimony o 
Mrs. Dohse and the records so produced (col 
lectively marked for identification purposes :i 
Defendant's Exhibit No. 33) would disciose thn 
upon receipt of the credit memo from the Gram 
Junction bank Osborne issued a credit memo t1 
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the "Certificates of Deposit" account in the Moab 
Hank transferring to that account $45,000.00 of 
the borrowed money to replace money which Os-
borne previously had diverted from that account; 
that the other $15,000.00 of the borrowed money 
received by Osborne through his issuance to him-
self of three cashier's checks, each for $5,000.00, 
which were redeemed by the Moab Bank without 
endorsement; that prior to the issuance by Os-
borne of the credit memo transferring $45,000.00 
to the certificates of deposit account, on June 9, 
1969, there was a shortage in that account of 
$45,000.00; that the carbon copies of three time 
certificates of deposit, (Nos. 129, 179 and 7 5, in 
the amounts of $15,000.00, $10,000.00 and $20,-
000.00 respectively-see Defendant's Exhibit 
No. 33) were missing; that subsequent to that 
date, June 9, 1969, two of those time certificates 
of deposit were redeemed by the bank from cus-
tomers who had purchased the certificates of de-
posit and the other certificate was renewed; that 
the funds which Osborne diverted from the cer-
tificates of deposit account were appropriated by 
Os borne to his own personal use and benefit 
through the issuance of cashier's checks ( 17 in 
number; copies of which are parts of Defendant's 
Exhibit 33 for identification purposes); that these 
cashier's checks were issued and signed by Os-
borne in July and August of 1967, and March and 
May of 1969; and that the total of those cashier's 
checks is $65,000.00. (R. 22-25) (The complete 
off er of proof is set out in the Appendix to this 
Brief.) 
Counsel for defendant Hudson also offered in evi-
dence an exemplified copy of an indictment, returned by 
a federal Grand Jury in the District Court of the United 
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States for the Distr,d of Vtah, charging Osborne wit! 
embezzlement of said sums of money ( $15,000.00 
$10,000.00, aud $:.W,000.00) from the :Moab N ationa 
Bank to pay his own personal obligations. Attached ti 
the copy of ihe indictment was an exempiified copy of~ 
minute entry of proceulings before that federal court or, 
February 5, 1!)71, at 'vhich time Osborne entered a plea 
of guilty to each count uf the indictment. ( Defendanh 
Exhibit numbered for identification purposes as No. 31) 
The significance of the offered evidence as to wha: 
Osborne actually did with the borrowed money lies ir 
the following: 
I. That evidence bears directly upon the ques 
tion: What was Osborne's real reason for borrow 
ing the money? No one will contend that the Firs 
National Bank would have loaned the money ti 
Osborne if it had known that he was going to us1 
the money to conceal his embezzlements. And rn 
one will contend that Hudson, even if he had beer 
advised of the loan application, would have dom 
anything to help Osborne conceal his misappro 
priations of money from the bank of which he wa: 
the executive officer, or from any other bank 01 
institution. It is logical, therefore, to infer fron 
this evidence that Osborne deceived both Hudsor 
and the First National Bank. 
2. The use of borrowed funds to replace mone: 
embezzled from the Moab bank was the final ac 
in the scheme or plan devisl'cl by Osborne to con 
ceal his unlawful acts. Other parts of this scherni 
were: (a) to obtain a loan from the First N ationa 
Bank without disclosing the true purpose fo 
which he needed the money; (b) to obtain a gen 
26 
uine signature from Hudson on a financial state-
ment by deceiving him to believe it would be used 
in an entirely unrelated proposed venture to buy 
control of the Moab Bank; (c) by deception and 
trick obtain Hudson's signature on a loan guar-
anty agreement and to submit the same to the 
bank in support of the loan application; ( d) use 
the genuine and witnessed signature of Hudson 
on his financial statement to convince the First 
National Bank that there was no need to contact 
Hudson to verify his willingness and intention to 
guarantee the proposed loan; and ( e) to further 
conceal his embezzlements by failing to advise the 
directors of the Moab National Bank of the loan 
he had obtained from the First National Bank-
concealment of the loan from the directors of his 
bank was a violation of federal statute which re-
quires that when an officer of a national bank ob-
tains a loan of this size from another bank the 
loan must be disclosed in writing by the borrower 
to his board of directors. (Title 12 U.S.C. Sec. 
375a) 
Section 375n of Title 12, U.S.C. provides in sub-
division (I) what l'.~ans a national bank may make to its 
own executiYe officers. SubdiYision ( 6) provides as fol-
lows: 
" ( 6) 'Vhenever an executive officer of a mem-
ber bank becomes indebted to any bank or banks 
(other than the one of which he is an officer) on 
account of extensions of credit of any one of the 
three categories respectively ref erred to in para-
graphs (2) [mortgage loam not exceeding $30,-
000.00), (3) [educational loans not exceeding 
$10,000.00], and ( 4) [general limitation of $5,-
000.00 on loans not otherwise specifically author-
ized] in an aggregate amount greater than the 
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aggregate amount of credit of the same categori 
that could lawfully be extended to him by th; 
bank, he shall make a written report to the boan 
of directors of the bank, statmg the date arn 
amount of each such extension of credit, the se 
curity therefor, and the purposes for which th 
proceeds have been or are to be used." 
Osborne·s scheme or plan depended upon (I) de 
ceiving everyone involved as to his real purpose in ob 
taining the borrowed funds, and ( 2) concealing every 
thing, even the fact of the loan itself, from Hudson am 
the board of directors of the :Moab National Hank. Thi 
similarity of all of his acts, involving misrepresentation 
concealment, and deception is evident. His goal-con 
cealment of his embezzlements-was to be accomplishe1 
by using the borrowed money to replace the money h 
had diverted and appropriated to his own personal us: 
and benefit. The use he made of the borrowed fund 
throws the spotlight on each of his separate acts and d~ 
closes his motives, his intent, his purpose and his desigi 
and scheme. The fact that the use of the money borrowe1 
from the bank discloses prior criminal activity on th 
part of Osborne does not make the evidence inadmissiblt 
The clear, concise and indubitable proof offered wit' 
reference to the use of the money to conceal earlier dt 
falcations justifies the making of inferences with respel 
to Osborne's acts of misrepresentation and deception 1 
dealing with the Grand Junction bank, in dealing wit 
Hudson, and in dealing with his own bank, all in con 
nection with the matter of borrowing $60,000.00. It i 
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for that purpose that the evidence was offered-not to 
prove the commission of other crimes. 
The trial Court was "worried" about whether dis-
closure of what Osborne did with the borrowed money 
would "inflame the jury to the extent that they, well by 
golly we're goiug to find this way regardless, any fellow 
that will do that will do anything." (R. IO). Also, al-
though the trial Court thought that Hudson would not 
have signed the loan guaranty agreement if he had known 
of Osborne's embezzlements, he believed that what Hud-
son learned later as to how the money was used had no 
bearing upon the question of whether he signed the guar-
anty. (R. 14-15) 
In discussing the question whether the criminality 
of conduct is a reason for excluding that conduct if it 
would otherwise be relevant and admissible, '¥"igmore 
states: 
"The well established princple of Multiple Ad-
missibility, applied in numerous ways, declares 
that the inadmissibility of an evidential fact for 
one purpose does not prevent its admissibility for 
any other purpose otherwise proper.*** If there 
is any other material or evidential proposition, for 
which it is relevant, and if it is offered for that 
purpose, it is receivable, and its quality as miscon-
duct or crime does not stand in the way." ('¥"ig-
more on Evidence, Third Edition, Vol. I, Sec. 
216). 
•
1 
Wigmore gives two answers to the statement, sometimes 
J made, that in the case of an accused person, where past 
1 crimes are offered, there is greater danger of abuse and 
greater risks of harm in case of abuse: 
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"One is dogmatic, that there is no difference in 
the rules of evidence for criminals and for civil 
cases. The other is practical, that an exception 
such as here suggested would handicap the State 
in its prosecution of the man of cumulative crim-
inal darmg. The greater the criminal brought to 
bar, the more closely the traces of his crime were 
involved in other misdeeds, the more stupendorn 
his scheme of crime culminating in the act charg-
ed, so much the more safe and invulnerable would 
he have rendered himself, if the law were ma<le 
thereby to lose this evidential material. By every 
spot of blood with which he taints the steps of his 
criminal progress, he succeeds in increasing the 
safety of his new crimes. This is an ample reason, 
if no other were even conceivable, for refusing to 
make an exception, already antagonistic to prin-
ciple and obnoxious to practical procedure. 'No 
man,' in the neat phrase of l\Ir. Justice Brewer. 
'can by multiplying crimes diminish the volumt 
of testimony against him.' " (Id.) 
Wigmore states this conclusion: 
"Now the possibility of the abuse or misappli-
cation of such evidence is no sufficient reason for 
making such an exception. This possibility existl 
equally for all the other cases above-mentioned: 
and it is always open to the opponent, here a~ 
there, to have the jury fully instructed in the lim 
ited purpose and use of the evidence." (Id.) 
This Court in State v. Mares, 113 U. 225, 192 P.2d 
861, held that a "relevant fact does not become incompe· 
tent because it may tend to establish another and separate 
crime." See also State v. Pollock, 102 U. 587, 129 P.2d 
554; State v. Kappas, 100 U. 274, 114 P.2d 205; and 
Abshier t'. People, 87 Colo. 507, 289 Pac. 1081. 
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One of the more frequently cited federal cases is 
Suhay v. U.S., 95 F.2d 890 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 304 
U.S. 580, where the court said: 
"It is fundamental that an accused cannot be 
convicted upon proof that he committed another 
offense; and it is axiomatic that ordinarily evi-
dence of a crime wholly separate, independent, 
and without any relation to the one laid in the in-
dictment is not admissible. But relevant evidence 
which tends to prove a material fact should not be 
excluded merely because it shows or tends to 
show that the accused committed another offense 
at a different time and place. The test in measur-
ing the admissibility of evidence is whether it is 
material to any issue in the case on trial." 
See also: JV eeks v. United States, 313 F.2d 688 ( 10 Cir. 
1963); Troutman v. United States, 100 F.2d 628 (10 
Cir.); and O'Dell t'. United States, 251 F.2d 704 (IO 
Cir.). 
'Vhat is the relevancy, the materiality, of Osborne's 
actions in using the proceeds of the loan, $45,000.00 of it 
at least, to try to conceal prior embezzlements? It is rea-
sonable to infer from those actions, which the offered 
evidence would establish by clear and convincing proof, 
that use of the borrowed money to conceal prior em-
bezzlements was not an afterthought, but was the impell-
ing consideration in every step he took to obtain the loan. 
It is an understatement to say that it is merely reasonable 
to infer from his actions that he did not deal honestly 
with anyone who was concerned with the purpose for 
which he sought to borrow the money; with the First Na-
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tional Bank in whatever representations he may have 
made as to why he needed the money and why Hudson 
was willing to co-sign with him or guarantee his note; 
with Hudson to whom he made the representation that 
he needed Hudson's financial statement in connection 
with a proposal that the controlling stock of the Moab 
National Bank might be offered for sale; with Hudson 
in whatever trick or artifice he employed to obtain Hud-
son's signature to the loan guaranty agreement without 
Hudson's knowledge that he was signing such an instru-
ment; with the b'.mk, of which he was the executive offi. 
cer, in failing to comply with federal law ( 12 U.S.C. Sec. 
37 5a) requiring him to report to its board of directors in 
writing setting out the date and amount of the loan, the 
secur:ty therefor, "and the purposes for which the pro-
ceeds haYe been or are to be used." 
'Ve are reminded of the statement that "Fraud as-
sumes as many and complex forms as the ingenuity of 
man is able to deYise." (Peskin 'l'. Squires, 156 C.A.2d 
240, 319 P.2d 40.5, 411 (1958)). Also the statement by 
Cooley in his work on Torts, 3rd Ed., p. 933: 
"The ways of fraud are infinite in their diversity, 
and if into any one of them all the law refuses to 
follow for the rescue of victims, it will be in the 
direction of that one that fraudulent devices will 
specifically tend." 
Osborne was under a compelling necessity of ob· 
taining Hudson's signature on two documents-one a 
financial statement, and the other a loan guaranty 
agreement. One of the signahires had to be witnessed 
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so that the Grand Junction bank could compare that 
signature with the signature on the other document. He 
concocted a story that he and Hudson might be able 
to purchase the controlling stock interest in the Moab 
National Bank because the president of the bank was old 
and might want to sell out, and that he needed a financial 
statement signed by Hudson to have on hand for that 
purpose. Hudson had the statement prepared and he 
signed it on June 2, 1969, before a witness. The state-
ment was addressed to the ]}foab National Bank and was 
delivered to Osborne at the bank on the day it was signed. 
Osborne wasted no time in sending the financial state-
ment to the Grand Junction bank. Mackley acknowl-
edged receiving it the next day, June 3, 1969, in a letter 
he wrote to Os borne enclosing the promissory note for 
Osborne's signature and that of .Mr. Hudson. (Plain-
tiff's Exhibit No. 2; Defendant's Exhibit No. 28; R. 
133). 
The offered evidence would justify the following 
inferences: 
1. That had Hudson knowingly and voluntar-
ily guaranteed such a loan Hudson would natur-
ally have been concerned with what use would be 
made of the proceeds of the loan. 
2. That Hudson would not have knowingly and 
voluntarily signed the loan guaranty agreement 
had it been disclosed to him that the purpose of 
the loan was to obtain money to conceal prior em-
bezzlements. 
3. That, therefore, in order to obtain Hudson's 
signature on the guaranty agreement Osborne had 
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to trick, defraud and deceive Hudson into sign-
ing the document. 
The admissibility of the evidence offered to show 
Osborne's real purpose in borrowing the money is clearly 
allowed by Rule 55 of the Rules of Evidence adopted by 
this Court effective July 1, 1971. That Rule provides: 
"Subject to Rule 47 [Character Trait as Proof 
of Conduct] evidence that a person committed a 
crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion, is in-
admissible to prove his disposition to commit 
crime or ciYil wrong as the basis for an inference 
that he committed another crime or civil wrong on 
another occasion but, subject to Rules 45 [Dis-
cretion of Judge to Exclude Admissible Evi-
dence] and ~8 [Character Trait for Care or Skill 
-Inadmissible to Prove Quality of Conduct}. 
such evidence is admisJ.sible when relevant to 
prove some other material fact including absence 
of mistake or accident, motive, opportunity, in· 
tent, preparation, plan, knowledge or identity." 
(Emphasis added.) 
The Note to this Rule provides: 
"NOTE: The generally accepted rule prohibits 
evidence of another crime or civil wrong as proof 
that a person committed a crime or civil wrong on 
a specified occasion. The things set forth above 
are only exemplary and not exclusive." 
Evidence as to what Osborne did with the money bears 
directly upon his motive, intent, and the plan or scheme 
he concocted to borrow the money without disclosing the 
loan to either Hudson or the Moab Bank. 
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POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO ADMIT IN EVIDENCE THE OFFERED 
TESTIMONY OF \\TILLIAM S. MAY RELA-
TIVE TO ADl\IISSIOXS AND DECLARATIONS 
MADE HY OSBORNE. 
The following testimony by William S. May relat-
ing to a conversation he had with Osborne in April or 
May of 1970 when the Moab Bank was being examined 
by bank examiners, and just after Osborne had come out 
of a meeting of the board of directors, was offered by 
counsel for defendant Hudson but rejected by the court: 
"The statement he made at that time was to the 
effect, well I might as well tell you about it, you'll 
know about it anyway. I asked what he meant, 
and he said there was an unlisted loan at the First 
National Bank in the amount of sixty thousand 
dollars. * * * And I never thought too much about 
it one way or another, and I asked him how the 
loan come about and he said that Jim Hudson 
guaranteed the loan. And he said, that I finally 
was able to hang one in him. I've been laying for 
him for some time and I finally got the chance to 
do it. And that was about the extent of the con-
versation." (R. 108) 
In that statement Osborne admitted that the 
$60,000,00 loan obtained by him from the First National 
Bank was unlisted and that he had failed to comply with 
the requirement off ederal statute Section 375a, Title 12, 
United States Code. As we have noted, that statute re-
quired Osborne to report the loan in writing to the board 
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of directors of the .Moab bank and advise them of the 
amount and date of the loau, security and "the purposes 
for which the proceeds have been or are to be used." The 
inference that would have been established by the evi. 
dence discussed under Point I-that Osborne had failed 
to report the loan to the board of directors-would be· 
come an admitted fact under the testimony of May. The 
inference that rea2'onably could be made from the offered 
evidence d;scussed under Point I- that Osborne could 
not have dealt honestly and forthrightly with Hudson 
and was forced to deceive Hudson and conceal from hiru 
the fact that Osborne ·was seeking a loan for money to 
be used to cover prior embezzlements-is supported and 
made stronger by his admission that he had been "laying 
for" Hudson and finally was able to "hang one in him." 
l\Ioreover, the admissions of Osborne to :May disclosed 
malice toward Hudson from which an intent to defraud 
could be inferred. 
A general statement of the exception to the hearsay 
rule which permits the receipt in evidence of admissiom 
against interest is found in 29 Am .J ur 2d, Sec. 600: 
"The hearsay rule, in general renders inadmis. 
sible in evidence unsworn statements made out oJ 
court offered as proof of the facts asserted. How 
ever, the admissions of a party made directly b) 
him, or through his agent duly authorized to speak 
for him, or by a privy, relative to the subject mat· 
ter of a suit, are admissible in evidence againsl 
such party where they are inconsistent with tht 
daim he asserts in the action, whether he is the 
plaintiff or the defendant, and whether or not ht 
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is available as a witness. Any statement made by 
a party to an action which is against his own in-
terest and which, in its nature, tends to establish 
or disprove any material fact, or alleged material 
fact, in the case, is competent to be put in evidence 
against him in the trial of that action. The fact 
that an admission is made by a party prevents it 
from being classed as ordinary hearsay, it being 
said in some instances that such admissions are not 
hearsay at all. The real reason why admissions of 
a party may be used as proof of his opponent's 
case is not that the utterance is against the interest 
of the speaker, but that the law holds everyone 
responsible for what he says to the extent that his 
sayings may be used as evidence against himself 
of the truth of what he has said. An admission of 
a party to an action of ten gives the best inter-
pretation of a matter in issue. * * *" 
The following exception to the hearsay rule is set 
out in Rule 63 ( 10) of the Rules of Evidence adopted 
by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah effective 
July 1, 1971: 
" ( 10) Declarations Against Interest. Subject 
to the limitations of exception ( 6), a statement 
which the judge finds was made by a declarant 
who is unavailable as a witness and which was at 
the time of the assertion so far contrary to the de-
clarant' s pecuniary or proprietary interest or so 
far subjected him to civil or criminal lia~ility or 
so far rendered invalid a claim by him agamst an-
other or created such risk of making him an ob-
ject of hatred, ridicule or social disapproval t~at 
the declarant under the circumstances existmg 
would not have made the statement unless he be-
lieved it to be true;" 
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The admissibility of admissions against interest, of 
course, is determined by the Court. According to further 
statements in said Section 600 the "courts necessarily 
have latitude in determining the admissibility of such 
evidence" and admission or rejection should be deter-
mined with a view to all the facts and circumstances of 
the case and the rules of law governing admissibility of 
such evidence. In Section 602 of 29 Am J ur 2d it is 
stated that an admission against interest, like all other 
evidence, is admissible only if it is relevant to issues in 
the case. Admissions of a party which are relevant to the 
issues are admissible notwithstanding the transaction to 
which they refer, or out of which thE'y rise, is not itself 
related to the issue before the Court. 
It is also said that admissions or declarations, to be 
competent, must have been expressed in definite, certain 
and unequivocal language, and should not be in the fonn 
of conclusions, opinions, or understandings acquired by 
the witness from unexplained acts or words of the de-
clarant. ( 29 Am J ur 2d Sec. 604) 
The trial court in ruling on the offered evidence 
commented that he thought it was vague and susceptible 
to many interpretations. Later he amplified his ruling in 
these words : 
"THE COURT: Well, I might just take one 
or two moments here and amplify my ruling on 
the witness that was just excused. I had the court 
reporter again read his testimony and it was as I 
had remembered it. He starts it out by saying that 
Osborne told him that Hudson had guaranteed 
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the loan and he said I've been laying for him a 
loug time, I finally got him. Now to clarify my 
ru1mg it is this. I contend I don't know whether 
he meant that he, he said that he guaranteed the 
loan, I don't know whether he meant he guaran-
teed the loan, I cant pay it, he's going to have to 
pay it, that would be hanging one on him. He 
didn't use the words I practiced fraud on him to 
get him to sign or I hung one on him by getting 
him to sign or that he didn't know what he was 
signing. He prefaced it by saying he guaranteed 
the loan. I finally hung one on him. And I don't 
know what he meant by that remark, whether, 
you see, whether he meant he's going to have to 
pay it because I can't pay it. That would be hang-
ing one on him, but I noted particularly and I had 
the reporter as I said read it over to me word for 
word again. He didn't say I hung one on him by 
getting him to sign it and he didn't know what he 
was doing, or practicing artifice on him or slight 
of hand or some ruse. This is after he got him to 
sign he hung one on him. To me it may mean that 
he is simply going to have to pay this. This is 
hanging one on him you see, so that is the reason 
that I ruled as I did. I wanted to clarify it. All 
right, when I said it was vague that's what I 
meant." (R. 111-112) 
When asked if he could remember words used by 
Osborne, May replied that he could not remember "it 
happened so long ago" and "that is the substance of it, 
but they are my words." ( R. 109) 
We submit that May's testimony as to what Os-
borne said does not disclose the vagueness, uncertainty 
and susceptibility to many interpretations that the trial 
court found. Osborne told May: 
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I. There was an unlisted loan for $60,000.00 
with the First National Bank in Grand Junction. 
There is nothing unclear, indefinite or vague 
about that. 
2. Hudson had guaranteed it-a simple, clear, 
unambiguous statement. 
3. He had been "laying for him for some time" 
and finally was able to "hang one in him." These 
are uneqmvocal and descriptive statements of Os-
borne's ill will and malice toward Hudson, and 
when they are considered, for admissibility, "with 
a view to all the facts and circumstances of the 
case" and with the "latitude" extended to the 
court" in determining the admissibility of such 
evidence," ( 29 Am J ur 2d Sec. 600) it is not un-
reasonable to conclude that Osborne actually was 
gloating over his success in the cleverest step in 
his scheme-that of getting Hudson's signature 
on the loan guaranty agreement without his 
knowledge that he was signing such an instru-
ment. 
If .May had quoted Osborne as saying "I practiced 
fraud on him to get him to sign,'' or that in getting him to 
sign he was "practicing artifice on him or slight of hand 
or some ruse" the trial court would have had good basis 
for refusing to receive such conclusions, opinions or un-
derstandings acquired by the witness from unexplained 
acts or words of the declarant. ( 29 Am J ur 2d Sec. 604) 
'Ve submit that :May's testimony relative to the ad-
missions and declarations made by Osborne was admiss-
ible under Rule 63 ( 10) of the Rules of Evidence. That 
Osborne was unavailable appears from the following: 
'"l'HE CO UR'l': Could I ask you this? This 
ha_s bothered me. Why hasn't someone taken Os-
borne's deposition? 
"l\IR. SAPERSTEIN: They attempted to 
and he didn't appear. 
"MR. JENSEN: We noticed him, we tried to 
get him. 
"THE COURT: Seems to me he could shed 
a lot of light on many of these things. 
"MR. JENSEN: We tried to get him but his 
attorney wouldn't produce him. He has left the 
state." (R. 189) 
Osborne's statements to May disclosed malice toward 
Hudson from which an intent to defraud could be in-
f erred, and they "·ere so far against his interest as to 
make them admissible under Rule 63 (IO). 
III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO RECEIVE IN EVIDENCE EXPERT OPIN-
ION THAT _MACKLEY DID NOT CONFORl\'1 
TO THE STANDARDS OF AN ORDINARY 
PRUDENT BANKER OR TO REASONABLE 
COMMERCIAL STANDARDS IN THE BANK-
ING BUSINESS. 
Counsel for defendant Hudson offered in evidence 
the expert opinions of John M. Chatelain, Senior Ex-
aminer for the Utah Department of Financial Institu-
tions, in charge of all examinations of banks, credit in-
stitutions, finance compames and savings and loan 
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associations in the state ( R. 179) as to whether the 
conduct of .Mackley in making the loan of $60,000.00 
to Osborne was conduct of an ordinary prudent banker 
or whether that conduct conformed with reasonable 
commercial standards in the banking business. Mr. 
Chatelain's answers to hypothetical questions asked by 
counsel were as follows: 
"A. I feel that he did not act in accordance with 
the conduct of completing a file in a prudent 
manner in this particular assumed situation." ( R. 
197) 
"A. That he did not conform to the reasonably 
acceptable standard of commercial lending." (R. 
198) 
In answer to a question as to what Mackley should have 
done in making the loan had he acted as an ordinary 
prudent banker, Mr. Chatelain stated: 
"A. A definite contact should have been made 
with the, Mr. Hudson. Since the loan was obvi-
ously going to be made on the basis of his guar-
antee. His file should have been complete, com-
pletely documented in writing showing that a con-
tact had been made preferably in person, but had 
he made the contact and knew of his own cer-
tainty that he was talking to Mr. Hudson then 
backed it up by documentation such as a credit 
report in writing or a memorandum that contact 
had been made through the credit bureau. In other 
words, complete a file on this borrower since he 
was unknown to the bank. Aud since also that this 
amount was considerably in excess of what had 
been usually transacted or loans made to Mr. Os-
borne." (R. 199) 
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Mr. Chatelain also testified that his answer would be 
the same if the question were asked 'Vhat should Mr. 
Mackley have done prior to disbursing these funds to 
Osborne, if he had acted in accordance with reasonable 
commercial standards of the banking business. (R. 199) 
Through questions to Mr. Chatelain counsel 
brought out the following bearing upon his qualifica-
tions: 
He had been with the State Bank Commission 
or the Department of Financial Institutions for 
ten years and seven months. (R. 190) 
He had been in the banking business nearly 
twenty two years before he went with the State 
Uank Commission. 
Before he was employed by the Department of 
Financial Institutions he was engaged as a pri-
vate banker with the Union Bank and Trust Co. 
for nearly twenty-two years. (R. 191) 
While at that bank he was engaged in making 
loans of all kinds-installment loans, real estate 
loans, commercial loans, servicing loans for in-
stitutional investors; and in hiring, training and 
supervising bank personnel. ( R. 192) 
That as a result of his contacts with representa-
tives of the F.D.I.C. and joint examinations con-
ducted with them he had become acquainted with 
generally accepted and reasonable commercial 
practices and standards throughout the nation, 
and that he was not aware of anv differences in 
such standards and practices froni one federal re-
serve district to another. (R. 193) 
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Under questioning by the trial court Mr. Chatelain 
testified that he was familiar with nationally accepted 
standards. The Court then stated: 
'"l'HE COURT: 'Yell, I think that if he can 
establish a banking standard he can tell whether 
or not this practice conforms to the standard, I 
believe. Unless you cau convince me otherwise. 
"That do you say about that?" ( R. 183) 
After discussion by counsel the Court further interro-
gated the witness as follows: 
"THE COUR 'l': Isn't there a lot of discretion 
placed in the individual banker whether a loan 
should be made or not ? 
"A. Yes. 
"THE COURT: Don't a lot of bankers look 
at a man and say, I think you're a, you're good 
for it without investigation? 
''A. 'iV e discourage that. 
"THE COURT: ''rel!, they do it don't they? 
"A. Right. I have to admit that. 
"THE COURT: Character loan, depends on 
who the man is doesn't it? 
"A. Right. He should be known to the bank 
officer, bank officials. He should be able to back 
up loans he made without specific authority by a 
file. 
"THE COURT: Under the question given 
you, thz~ hypothetical questiou asked you it would 
mean just about, if any loan went sour, wasn't 
paid, the banker was negligent wouldn't it? 
"A. Not necessarily. nut h;s loan comm~ttee or 
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his superiors would determine if he followed a 
procedure that they had charged him with m 
order to make that loan." (R. 186-187) 
The Court announced his decision as follows: 
"THE COURT: I think my mind is made up, 
as Judge Keller used to say. No need for any 
more argument. It appears to me that this, we are 
making a very complicated case I think of some-
thing that to me is relatively simple. Number 1, 
did Hudson sign the loan agreement? I think that 
has been established. Number 2, was any fraudu-
lent misrepresentation made to get him to sign the 
agreement? That is the other proposition. If so, 
assuming that there were such, the next is, did the 
bank, the Plaintiff bank have knowledge thereof 
or was it put on notice that he was imposed upon 
for the purpose of obtaining his signature on the 
loan guaranty agreement. That is all I see to this 
case. Very simple proposition. Now here it seems 
to be we are trying to show despite the fact that 
there is no uniformity in making loans, despite the 
fact that a great deal of discretion is vested in the 
loan officer who makes the loan, we are trying to 
judge whether or not Mr. Mackley acted pru-
dently in making this loan. And to the Court it 
does not appear that is the real issue. The real 
issue is whether or not 1\fr. l\1acklev or the bank 
had knowledge of any imposition b~ing practiced 
upon the Defendant to obtain the loan if such 
were done. And I don't believe that this testimony 
goes to prove or tend to prove that issue. Hence I 
think I shall sustain the objection." ( R. 188) 
After the off er of proof was made by putting hypo-
thetical questions to Mr. Chatelain the Court made the 
following additional comments as to his ruling: 
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"THE COURT: I want to add the reason 
that the testimony of Mr. Chatelain was not re-
ceived by the Court, I want to make a record on 
that. In that the Court feels that it is irrelevant as 
to whether or not prudent practice was followed 
with respect to the liability of the Defendant 
Hudson on the guaranty. The Court is of the 
opinion that if he were to rule that every time a 
banker acted imprudently or not reasonably in 
making a loan and had a guaranty that that loan 
or guaranty would be questionable and that 
would upset our whole commercial practice. If we 
are going to say now here is a guaranty or here is 
a co-signed note I wonder if the banker who made 
that loan or the loan officer acted prudently or 
reasonably? If he didn't, we have made, left a per-
fact defense for the defendant to come in and say 
the banker shouldn't have made that loan, there-
fore the co-signer or guarantor should be released 
from his liability. And I don't think that is the 
issue here. I think the sole issue here is whether or 
not there was an imposition practiced upon Mr. 
Hudson to get his signature to that loan guaranty 
agreement and whether the bank had notice there-
of." (R. 201) 
A. GIVEN THE SAME CIRCUMSTANCES 
UNDER 'VHICH MACKLEY l\1ADE THIS 
LOAN, AN ORDINARY PRUDENT BANKER 
WOULD HA VE MADE INQUIRY OF HUD-
SON. ACCORDINGLY, MACKLEY 'VAS PUT 
ON A DUTY OF INQUIRY AND CHARGE-
ABLE 'VITH NOTICE OF ALL SUCH IN-
QUIRY WOULD DISCLOSE. 
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'l'he question put by the trial court-whether the 
bank had notice of Osborne's fraud-is the very ques-
tion to which the proffered testimony was directed, be-
cause .Mackl:ey's conduct as a reasonable prudent 
banker bears upon the question of whether he is charge-
able with notice of the imposition upon Hudson. 
As demonstrated elsewhere in this brief, the bank's 
notice is germane if Hudson is found to have been 
negligent in signing the guaranty. If Hudson was not 
negligent then he has a complete defense on the basis 
of fraud in f actum regardless of lack of notice to the 
bank. 
If it is assumed, argnendo, that Hudson was neg-
ligent in signing the loan guaranty agreement, which 
defendant Hudson strenuously denies, the question 
raised by the trial court, whether Mackley had notice 
of the fraud, is presented. In speaking of the "notice" 
here involved this Court in J ungk v. Holbrook, 15 
Utah 198, 49 Pac. 305, stated that it "does not mean 
actual and direct information. If a party is put upon 
inquiry as to a particular fact, then he is charged in 
law with whatever inquiry will disclose." In IO Willis-
ton on Contracts, (3rd Ed. Jaeger, 1967) sec. 1248, 
p. 791, it is stated as follows: 
"Of course, if the creditor at the time when he 
took the contract was chargable with notice of the 
principal's deception or compulsion or did not 
give value for the obligation, the surety, on ordi-
nary equitable principals is excused." 
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In 38 Am. J ur. 2nd, Guaranty, sec. 59, p. 1061, it is 
stated that '"Knowledge on the part of the creditor as 
to the imposition practiced on the guarantor may be 
imputed from his knowledge of other facts." 
It is submitted that .Mackley was put upon inquiry, 
and that he is charged with what that inquiry would 
have disclosed. If he had personally contacted Hudson 
he would have learned that Hudson knew nothing about 
the proposed loan, was not a ware of ever signing the 
loan guaranty agreement, and had no intention of guar-
anteeing a loan to Osborne. The issue of whether 
Mackley, the banker, was charged with a duty of inquiry 
must of necessity be determined by reference to whether 
a reasonable prudent banker would have made inquiry 
under the same circumstances. This was felt to be a 
matter properly for expert testimony. The assumed 
facts were weighed by Mr. Chatelain and from them 
he concluded that had :1\-iackley acted as a prudent 
banker would have acted, and had Mackley acted in 
conformity to reasonable commercial standards, he 
would have made inquiry of Hudson. Those facts were: 
Mackley did not know Hudson or anything about 
him and except for one purported and unsuccess-
ful effort to reach him by telephone Osborne did 
nothing to reach Hudson to verify the loan guar-
anty agreement. 
l\iackley did not get a credit report on Hudson-
either oral or written. 
Mackley asked Osborne to furnish Hudson's fi. 
nancial statement. The statement furnished by 
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Osborne was addressed to the 1lloab bank, not the 
Grand Junction Bank. 
Hudson's signature on his financial statement 
was witnessed. His signature on the Loan Guar-
anty Agreement was not witnessed though the 
form used had a line for a witness to sign on . 
. Mackley sent the promissory note to Osborne for 
his signature and the signature of Hudson. In-
stead, Osborne substituted the loan guaranty 
agreement. 
The blank for information as to where the loan 
guaranty agreement had been signed was not 
completed. :Mackley had the blank completed to 
falsely show that it had been signed in Grand 
Junction. Similarly, Mackley added material to 
a blank to provide that the agreement should be 
construed according to the law of Colorado. 
Osborne's financial statement furnished to Mack-
ley showed a net worth of about $16,600.00, and 
that his salary was $15,600.00 a year. 'Vhile Os-
borne and his wife had borrowed from the Grand 
Junction Bank before they had never borrowed 
more than $3,500.00. 
Mackley did not consult with the loan committee 
of his bank about the loan, and he testified that he 
had no recollection of consulting with any other 
officer of that bank before disbursing the money 
to Osborne. 
B. IF lVIACKLEY'S CONDUCT DID NOT CON-
FORM TO REASONABLE COMlVIERCIAL 
STANDARDS IN THE BANKING BUSINESS, 
THE BANK SHOULD BE DENIED RECOV-
ERY UPON THE PRINCIPLE EXPRESSED 
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IN SECTION 70A-3-406, U.C.A., 1953, AS 
AMENDED. 
In 1965 the Utah Legislature adopted the uniform 
commercial code, Article 3, Sec. 406, of which became 
Section 70A-3-406 of the Utah Code Annotated 1953 
) 
as amended. That section provides: 
"Any pers.on who by his negligence substan. 
tially contributes to a material alteration of the 
instrument or to the making of an unauthorized 
signature is precluded from asserting the altera-
tion or lack of authority against a holder in due 
course or against a drawee or other payor who 
pays the instrument in good f a.ith and in accord-
ance with the reasonable commercial standards of 
the drawee's or payor's business." (Emphasis 
added.) 
In the case of Gresham State Bank v. 0 and K Con-
struction Company, (1962) 231 Or. 106, 370 P.2d 726, 
the above statutory provision, which had been adopted in 
Oregon was relied upon. The court held that in cashing 
checks payable to a construction company, and en-
dorsed by its off ice manager and bookkeeper to whom 
the cash was delivered, the party cashing the checks 
did not make payment of the checks in accordance with 
reasonable commercial standards of its business, and 
therefore the construction company could assert lack 
of authority of its office manager against such party 
even though the construction company's negligence 
substantially contributed to the unauthorized endorse-
ment of the checks. The facts in the case were that 
McKenna, off ice manager for 0 and K Construction 
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Co. placed unauthorized endorsements on checks receiv-
ed and payable to the construction company (by the use 
of a rubber stamp as to the name of the company fol-
lowed by his name as "office manager" or "Bkpr") and 
cashed them at Zimmerman's store, receiving in cash 
the full amounts of the checks. The court held that while 
the officers of the construction company were not 
seriously at fault, in not discovering McKenna's decep-
tion, their conduct could be regarded as negligence, and 
the court held that Zimmerman was also at fault. In 
determining who should bear the loss the court con-
cluded that the quoted section of the uniform commer-
cial code expressed the appropriate principle. The court 
said: 
"'Ve begin with the well established rule that 
one who obtains possession of a check through 
the unauthorized endorsement of the payee's 
name acquires no title to it and is liable to the 
payee for the amount of the check unless the 
payee is precluded from setting up the want of 
authority. * * * 
"It seems evident that the 0 and K Construc-
tion Company's negligence was a causal factor 
contributing to the forgery. Each of the parties 
had a duty to exercise due care in connection with 
the checks in question. Each failed to perform its 
duty. The question is how to allocate the loss un-
der such circumstances. The conduct of each 
could be described in terms of negligence. Apply-
ing the accepted rule in other negligence cases, 
the defendant construction company would be 
barred from recovery because of its contributory 
negligence. But, it is not necessary or desirable to 
extend the doctrine of contributory negligence be-
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yond its present scope and there are special rea-
son!' why we should not do so in the la'v of com-
mercial paper. 
"The pattern for decision in cases such as the 
one before us is found in Sec. 3-406 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code which was adopted by the 
enactment of Oregon Laws 1961, Ch. 726, Sec. 
73.4060, to be effective on September 1, 1963 
*** 
"Although this section is not operative until 
September 1, 1963, it expresses the legislatire 
view as of the time of its enactment. There is no 
existing Oregon statute or adjudicated case which 
announces a contrary principle. As we ha Ye al-
ready indicated the cases in other jurisdictions are 
in conflict. 'Ve are, therefore, free to adopt the 
principle which, in our opinion, will comport with 
the needs of the business community in dealing 
with commercial paper under circumstances such 
as we have here. 'Ve believe that Section 3-406 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code expresses the ap-
propriate principle. 'Ve therefore adopt it. 'Ve 
believe that it is particularly appropriate to do so 
because it conforms to the view taken, at least 
tentatively, by the 1961 Legislative Assembly in 
adopting Oregon Laws 1961, Ch. 726, with a post-
poned effective date. 
"It is apparent that this section requires a 
weighing process in choosing between the owner 
of the forged instrument and the payor in allo-
cating the loss. Translating the section in terms of 
the factual situation before us, the 0 and K Con-
struction Company is not precluded from assert-
ing McKenna's lack of authority unless two con-
ditions exist: ( 1 ) that 0 and K Construction 
Company's negligence 'substantially contributes 
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to the making of the unauthorized signature', and 
( 2) Zimmerman made payment on the instrument 
in good faith 'and in accordance ·with the reason-
able commercial standards of the * * * payor's 
business.' " 
After taking judicial notice of the duty of Zimmerman 
to inquire as to .McKenna's authority to make the en-
dorsements, judicially recognized in many cases, the 
Court said: 
"In the ordinary case it seems proper that the 
negligent payor, rather than the negligent prin-
cipal, should bear the loss caused by an agent's 
unauthorized endorsement of his principal's 
check. An important factor supporting this con-
clusion is the relative ease with which the payor, 
having knowledge of the agency, can ascertain 
the agent's authority, as compared with the diffi-
culty with which an employee's dishonesty may be 
detected by his employer. The employer must 
overcome the obstacles which the employee de-
vises for the very purpose of making it difficult 
to detect the defalcations. Certainly under the cir-
cumstances of the present case, it was more rea-
sonable for the officers of the 0 and K Construc-
tion Company to assume that their employee was 
honest than it was for Zimmerman to assume that 
he had the authority to endorse checks and receive 
payment in cash for no ostensible corporate pur-
pose. * * * 
"We hold that, under the circumstances, Zim-
merman cannot rely upon the Construction Com-
pany's negligence to bar the latter's recovery. We 
reach this conclusion upon a de novo examination 
of the record, this being a proceeding in equity. 
The same conclusion would be permissible had 
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this been an action at law because, as we have in. 
dicated, Zimmerman's failure to act in accordance 
with reasonable commercial standards can be de. 
dared as a matter of law." 
See also, 38 Colo. Law Rev. ( 1965) pp. 46, 47. Com. 
pare, Park State Bank v. Arena Auto Auction, 207 
N.E. 2nd.158 (Ill.1965). 
Although the facts of the instant case relate to a 
fraudulently obtained signature on a separate loan 
guaranty agreement, not an endorsement of a nego. 
tiable promissory note, the guaranty was specifically 
received for one transaction only, evidenced by the nego-
tiable promissory note of the primary obligor, Osborne. 
Moreover, on principle, the two situations are identical. 
Here, the plaintiff bank, in substance and effect, in 
part contends and the trial court, in effect, found as 
a matter of law, that, even assuming fraud, Hudson, 
"by his negligence substantially contributed" ... to 
the making of what is tantamount to an unauthorized 
signature. That accordingly, "he is precluded from 
asserting . . . the lack of authority" against the bank. 
However, since the effective date of the Utah Uniform 
Commercial Code (January 1, 1966) , it is the declared 
policy of the State of Utah that this conclusion follows 
only if the instrument is paid in good faith and in "ac-
cordance with the reasonable commercial standards of 
' b . " ... payor s usmess. 
Moreover, since we are not dealing directly with 
a negotiable instrument, but a guaranty running di-
rectly to the bank, application here of the principle an-
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nounce<l above will create less of an impediment to the 
free flow of commercial paper than the literal appli-
cation of the statute to negotiable instruments. 
That this statute comports with the needs of the 
business community in dealing with commercial paper 
of all kinds and should therefore, be applied to the 
instant case is well illustrated by certain salient facts 
that evolved below. As in the Gresham case, supra, 
it was a matter of relative ease for .Mackley to have 
verified the guaranty with Hudson. On the other hand, 
Hudson, as the unknowing victim of a fraud, was obvi-
ously powerless to prevent the payment by the bank 
to Osborne. The more clever the ruse, the more difficult 
to detect, the more helpless was Hudson's position. 
Contrasted to Hudson's helplessness, Mackley, the 
banker, was in total control of the transaction-able 
to prevent the loss to the bank by exerting no more 
effort than is required to make one phone call. 
Can it be said, therefore, that Mackley's failure to 
act was in accordance with reasonabl~ commerc,al 
standards? It is submitted that his failure to act was 
so blatant that the court, as in the Gresham case, supra, 
would be justified in declaring it imprudent as a matter 
of law. Lest there be any question, however, that this 
was a matter for expert testimony, defendant elicited 
and proffered the expert opinoin of the witness Chate-
lain, whose testimony was erroneously excluded by the 
trial court. 
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IV 
'VHETHER HUDSON V\TAS NEGLIGENT IN 
SIGNING THE LOAN GUARANTY 'VAS A 
JURY QUESTION. 
One of the pivotal issues in this litigation is whether 
Hudson was negligent in signing the loan guaranty 
agreement. This defendant recognizes that the defense 
of fraud in the factum as to third parties without notice 
is limited to those instances where the victim is free 
from negligence. "'here the Yic~im is fre~ from negli-
gence, however, fraud in the factum constitutes a com-
plete defense to the claim of an innocent third party. 
The general rule is stated in 'Villiston on Con-
tracts, (3rd Ed., Jaeger, 1967), Vol. 10, Sec. 1248, 
as follows: 
"A creditor, who has in good faith given value 
for the surety's promise, cannot be denied the 
right to enforce it because of fraud ... on the part 
of the principal in securing the surety's signature 
unless the fraud . . . is of such character as to 
make totally void a writing obtained thereby." 
In Section 1488, Vol. 12, the same author states: 
"Fraud may induce a person to assent to do some-
thing which he would not otherwise have done, or 
it may induce him to believe that the act which he 
does is something other than it actually is. In the 
first case, the act of the defrauded person is op-
erative though voidable; in the second case, the 
act of the defrauded person is void, because he 
does not know he is doing, and does not intend, to 
do, this act. 
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"This distinction most commonly arises in the 
law of negotiable paper. It originated, however, 
in the law of sealed instruments and is still of gen-
eral application. Where a person is fraudulently 
induced to sign or endorse a bill or note in the rea-
sonable belief that he is signing something else, he 
cannot really be said to have made or endorsed 
the bill or note; hence, the ancient plea of non est 
factum is applicable. He is in effect stating that 
this is not his contract; in fact, it is not a contract 
at a 1l. ., 
In the Restatement of Contracts, Vol. 2, Sec. 47 5, 
the rule is stated in the comment as follows: 
".Fraud or misrepresentation may cause a person 
to do or to agree to do something that otherwise 
he would not have done or agreed to do. This is 
the typical case, and such a transaction is only 
voidable. But a person may also believe that his 
act is not a manifestation or assent to any trans-
action, or if a manifestation of assent to any trans-
action, to one entirely different from that which 
would have been created had there been no mis-
take. It is to such a case that the rule stated in the 
Section relates. The rule is here confined to cases 
where the mistaken belief is camed by misrepre-
sentation, fraudulent or innocent, though not nec-
essarily of a party to the transaction in question; 
but mistake of the same character if unaccom-
panied by negligence of the mistaken party also 
precludes the existence of a contract or a dis-
charge. It is only where the erroneous belief is 
justifiable that the rule governing fraud or mis-
take is applicable. A person is not within either 
rule who draws an unnatural or negligent infer-
ence as to the nature of an act." 
57 
As stated in the Restatement, the law appears to 
be that it is only in those instances where the signer 
of the writing was himself negligent in so signing, 
that he may be estopped from asserting the fraud as 
against an innocent third person who has given value 
therefor, did not participate in the fraud and is not 
chargeable with notice thereof. See also 22 Am. J ur., 
Fraud and Deceit, Sec. 171, p. 984. In 37 Am. J ur. 
2nd, Fraud and Deceit, Sec. 269, p. 359, the general 
rule is stated as follows: 
"According to the prevailing view, the general 
rule that failure to read or have a contract read to 
a party thereto before signing it precludes him 
from complaining about its contents does not 
apply in the case of fraud or misrepresentation. 
Thus, it is very of ten held that the instrument 
may be avoided where its execution is obtained 
by a misrepresentation of its contents so that the 
party signs a paper he did not know he was sign-
ing, and did not really intend to sign, even though 
he had an opportunity to read the pa per, or have 
it read to him, and did not do so. This is particu-
larly true where the circumstances are such that 
the defrauded person has reason to rely upon the 
representations_made to him. Thus, especially in 
a case between the original parties, where one is 
fraudulently misled as to the contents of the 
paper which he signs without reading, he is not 
estopped by his negligence from setting up the 
fraud, as he might be after third parties have 
acted upon it." 
In Johnson v. Allen, 158 P.2d 134 (Utah 1945) 
this Court reaffirmed its earlier position and without 
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limiting its statement of the law to the immediate parties 
to the contract lays down the following general propo-
sition: 
"The better view seems to be that a person will 
be given relief from fraud even though he failed 
to read the contract before signing if he was by 
some act or artifice induced to refrain from read-
ing it, or if because of the circumstances he was 
justified in relying on the representations made." 
See also Bennett v. Bowen, 238 Pac. 240, 243 (Utah, 
1925); Bancredit, Inc. v. Bethea, 68 N.J. Super. 62, 
172 A.2d 10 ( N .J .1961) ; and Anno. 160 A.L.R. 1295. 
In Bancredit, Inc. v. Bethea, supra, the court points 
out that where a person fully intends to bind himself 
on a commercial promissory instrument, he is under a 
duty to exercise the highest degree of care. 'Vhere, how-
ever, the signer does not intend to evidence a legal obli-
gation, he is under a lesser duty of care. 
Here, Hudson's undisputed testimony establishes 
that he did not realize that he was signing a commercial 
document. He was misled into believing that he was 
signing some kind of a paper relating to his waiver of 
interest on certificates of deposit cashed prior to the 
end of the 90-day period for which they were issued. 
Hudson's contact with Osborne was with an apparently 
trusted and responsible officer of the l\:loa b National 
Bank in his capacity as an officer of that bank con-
cerning a matter in which that officer had no personal 
interest. Can it be said as a matter of law that under 
such circumstances Hudson failed to act as an ordinary 
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prudent man in unwittingly signing the guaranty? w· e 
submit that it may not and that the trial court erred 
in taking that issue from the jury. 
v 
THE TRIAL COCRT ERRED IN DIRECTING 
A VERDICT FOR PLAINTIFF. 
Summary judgmeut is a drastic remedy and must 
be supported by evidence, admissions and inferences 
which, when viewed in the light most favorable to, in 
this case, defendant Hudson, shows that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the Grand 
Junction bank is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law. That test was laid down by this Court in Bullock 
v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 11 U2d 1, 354 
P.2d 559, with the further admonition: 
"Such showing must pr2clude al! reasonable 
possibility that the loser could, if given a trial, 
produce eYidence \vhich would reason<tbly sus-
tain a judgment in his favor." · 
This court, in another case, Lund v. Phillips Petroleum 
Company, 10 U2d 276, 351 P.2d 952, stated the test 
to determine the sufficiency of evidence to sustain a 
verdict as follows: 
"One nf the chief merits of the~ jury system is 
that it brings together a group of perscns rep-
resentin~ a cross-section of the communitv and 
takes advantage of the:r differences in po.int of 
view and obtains the benefit of their composite 
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judgment. It is obviously necessary to allow 
some latitude for the orbit within which reason-
able minds m'ly operate. To be sustainable in 
law the verdict need onlv fall within that orbit 
so that it can be said that there is substantial 
evidence from which reasonable minds could 
believe facts which will support it. Applying 
that principle here: even though the evidence 
was not such as to oblige the jury to find in ac-
cordance with the plaintiffs' claims, it seems 
hardly open to question that they could, within 
the limits of reason, have believed as they did ... " 
In Newton v. Oregon Short Line RR. Co., 43 
Utah 219, 134 P. 567, 570, Justice Frick made the fol-
lowing statement which has been quoted with approval 
in later Utah cases: 
" * * * unkss the question of negligence is free 
from doubt, the court cannot pass upon it as a 
<Juestion of law; that is, if after considering all 
the evidence and the inferences that may be de-
duced therefrom the court is in doubt whether 
reason:i ble men, in viewing and C'Onsidering all 
the evidence, might arrive at different conclu-
sions. then this very doubt determines the ques-
tion to be orie of fact for the jury and not one 
of law for the court. The court can nass uoon 
the question of negligence only in clear cdses. 
All others should be submitted to the jury. The 
reason of this is apparent from the fact that in 
this state all questions of fact are for the jury: 
and therefore, unless it is clear that in viewing 
and considering the evidence reasonable minds 
might not arrive at different conclusions, the 
case should go to the jury." 
See also, Sticlde v. Union P .RR. Co., 122 Utah 477, 
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251 P.2d 867; Lemmon v. Denver~ Rio Grande fVest. 
RR. Co., 9 Ctah 2d 195, 341 P.:2d ~15. 
In directing the yerdict for plaintiff bank the trial 
court said: 
"I appreciate the fact that there has been much 
said as to whether or not the loan officer*** Mr. 
Mackley, did all he could do or acted reasonably 
or prudently by not*** notifying Mr. Hudson 
about the loan guaranty agreement. * * * It is 
true that others in the banking busi,ness could ver:y 
well say more should have been done. Others like-
ly also would say that he did not act as a reason-
able and prudent man. I am satisfied we could get 
opinions on both sides.***" (R. 260-207) (Em-
phasis added. ) 
If, as the court said was the case, persons in the banking 
business would differ on the question whether Mackley 
should have contacted l\Ir. Hudson to inquire about his 
execution of the loan guaranty agreement, that issue was 
one for the jury. The court also expressed the view that 
Mackley's close business relationship with Osborne-
though "Admittedly a case of misplaced confidence."-
justified Mackley's complete reliance upon what Os-
borne told him relative to the loan guaranty agreement 
and relieved him of his duty to make inquiry of Hudson. 
On the question whether Osborne defrauded Rud· 
son the court said the jury would "have to indulge in a 
great many conjectures, inferences or speculations" to 
try to determine the circumstances under which Hudson 
signed the agreement, and that it would be difficult for 
the jury to "pinpoint any particular alleged fraud." In 
62 
the case of Peskin v. Squires, 156 C.A. 2d 240, 319 P.2d 
405, the California court made the following observa-
tions relative to fraud cases: 
"Fraud assumes as many and complex forms 
as the ingenwty of man is able to devise. Rarely 
can it be proved by direct evidence; usually, as 
here the plaintiff must establish his cause of 
ac:tion by circumstantial ev:dence, if at all. Trial 
judges ~hould be sensitiYe to the fact that a trial 
is a search for the truth and because of the 
nature of a fraud action liberality in the receipt 
of evidence should be indulged to a degree com-
mensurate with the difficulties of the proof. 
* * * [citation of cases] 24 Am . .J ur. Sec. 28L 
p. 126: 'A court in looking for proof of fraud 
is not confined to "wide open spaces" or detailed 
proof of fixed and definite overt acts or conduct. 
Facts of triflling importance when considered 
separately, or slight circumstances trivial and 
inconclusiYe in themselves, may afford clear evi-
dence of fraud when considered in connection 
with each other. It has been said that in most cases 
fraud can be made out only by a concatenation 
of circumstances, many of which in themsekes 
amount to very little but in connection with others 
make a strong case." 
Three observations should be made to the noted 
statements of the trial court: they appear to be exagger-
ated; issues are not to be taken from the jury merely be-
cause they are difficult to resolve; and the evidence of-
fered but rejected, as to the true purpose Osborne had 
in getting the loan-to cover up prior misappropriations 
from the .Moab bank-made it clear that Osborne had to 
commit a fraud on Hudson to keep him from learning of 
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the loan and, more importantly, obtain his signature 
without his knowledge. The rejected eYidence was clear, 
precise and indubitable. The trial court's rejection of 
that evidence was prejudicial error. At the very outset 
of the trial, after the jury had been impaneled and sworn, 
but out of the presence of the jury, the trial court ex-
pressed the view that one inference can be built upon an-
other inference only in criminal cases. In taking that po-
sition the court rejected the holding of this Court in 
State v. Hall, 145 P.2d 494. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's holding that the evidence received 
in this case, when viewed in the light most favorable 
to Hudson shows no genuine issue as to any material 
fact, is not supported by the evidence or applicable 
law. The prejudicial rulings of the court on defendant 
Hudson's offers of proof and its unjustified directed 
verdict for plaintiff, it is respectfully submitted, require 
that the judgment below be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Herschel J. Saperstein 
800 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Clinton D. Vernon 
414 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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APPENDIX 
Counsel for defendant Hudson made the following 
offers of proof: 
I. Off er of proof relative to dwposition of money 
loaned to Osborne; his indictment and plea of 
guilty. 
"l\IR. SAPERSTEIN: All right, if Your 
Honor please, I think we could stipulate for the 
record, could we not, Mr. Jensen, that we have 
heretofore argued this and rather than formally 
call l\lrs. Dohse, Mrs. Margaret Dohse, and hav-
ing her sworn inasmuch as the nature of her testi-
mony has heretofore been explored with the Court 
and the Court ruled yesterday that it would not 
be admissible, we can dispense with that formal-
ity. 
"MR. JENSEN: I would think so. 
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: Then if Mrs. Dohse 
were called and sworn and were permitted to 
testify in this case--
"MR. JENSEN: Is she here in the court-
room? (R. ll2) 
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: Yes she is here. Or 
was here. Oh, yes, there you are. Mrs. Dohse 
would testify to the following matters which the 
defendant Jim L. Hudson now offers to prove 
by virtue of such testimony. That she is the cash-
ier of the Moab National Bank of :Moab, Utah. 
That she has in her possession and under her con-
trol and supervision the books and records of said 
bank. That the books are kept and maintained in 
the usual and ordinary course of business of the 
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.Moab National Bank. That included among the 
books and records kept and maintained in the 
usual course of business of the Moab National 
Bank is a general ledger sheet relating to the 
First National Bank in Grand Junction, the 
Plaintiff. That the First National Bank in Grand 
Junction is a correspondent, a correspondent 
bank for the Moab National Bank. That she has 
examined said ledger sheet and is familiar with 
the contents thereof, and I presume, Mrs. Dohse, 
you have that ledger sheet with you now? 
(Lady sitting in the audience: Yes) 
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: In response to the 
subpoena. May I see those records? That she has 
with her present in Court the said ledger sheet and · 
we would propose to make, if we may, a photo-
copy of that ledger sheet part of the record in 
connection with this offer of proof. 
"MR. JENSEN: What does the ledger sheet 
show? 
"THE COURT: I have seen it. 
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: The 1edger sheet, she 
would testify that the ledger sheet shows a forty-
five thousand dollar debit entry on the 9th day 
of June, 1969, and a fifteen thousand dollar debit 
entry on the nth of June, 1969. 
"MR. JENSEN: What was the first date? 
"'l\1R. SAPERSTEIN: 9th day of June 
1969. 
"MR. JENSEN: And the other one? (R. 
113) 
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: The other one was 
on the 11th day of June, 1969. That is correct is 
it not, Mrs. Dohse? 
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(Lady sitting in the audience: It is the 9th 
day of June and the 11th). 
"MR. JENSEN: How much was that first! 
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: :Forty-five thousand 
dollars. Now you have the original of this ledger 
sheet and this copy that you have given me is 
true copy of the original is it not? 
(Lady s_itting in the audience: It is a true 
copy of the original. ) 
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: That also included 
among the books and records kept and main-
tain in the usual course of business of the Moab 
National Bank are certain debit tickets dated 
June 9, 1969, and June 10, 1969, noted to the 
account of the First National Bank in Grand 
Junction. Are those debit tickets included m 
this group here? 
(Lady sitting in the audience: Yes.) 
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: That she has in her 
possession each of those debit tickets referred 
to. That the debit ticket to the account of the 
First National Bank dated June 9, 1969, is in 
the amount of forty-five thousand dollars. And 
the debit ticket dated June 10, 1969 is in the 
amount of fifteen thousand dollars. That on 
each of these and there is a notation, approved, 
with the letter 0 by it, and on the second debit 
ticket dated June 10, 1969 there is a notation, 
loan Osborne. That the witness Mrs. Dohse, 
would tesitfy that she was personally acquainted 
with the Defendant Ralph Osborne. That until 
approximately July of 1970 she [sic] was em-
ployed as executive vice president of the Moab 
National Bank. That she is familiar with the 
handwriting of the said Ralph Osborne and that 
each of said debit tickets appears to be in his 
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handwriting. The witness would further testify 
that included among the books and records of 
the .Moab National Bank is a credit ticket dated 
June 9, 1969, in the amount of forty-five thou-
sand dollars to the account of the certificates of 
deposit. Also opposite the word approved on that 
credit ticket is- (R. 114) 
"MR. JENSEN: What was the date of that 
one? 
"MR. SAPERSTTEIN: June 9, 1969. 
"MR. JENSEN: Thank you. 
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: Also opposite the 
word approved on that credit ticket is the letter 
written out, 0. That also included among those 
records kept and maintained in the usual and or- ' 
dinary course of business of the Moab National 
Bank is a general ledger sheet relating to the 
time certificates of deposit issued by said Bank. 
That :Mrs. Dohse has with her in court today 
the original of said ledger sheet. That said ledger 
sheet reflects a credit entry in the amount of 
forty-five thousand dollars. 
"l\i!R. JENSEN: Are you going to offer those 
in? 
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: Yes, I am going to 
make those all part of the offer of proof. 
"MR. ANDERSON: You will have to have 
them marked. 
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: We can mark them 
perhaps as an appellate exhibit, Your Honor, 
I think that would be appropriate. And inas· 
much as Mrs. Dohse has the original here and 
has at my suggestion prepared photo copies to 
substitute for the original, if you have no objec· 
tion we will offer the photo copies. 
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".MR. JENSEN: All right. (R 115) 
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: lVIrs. Dohse would 
further testify that in May of 1970 she was in-
structed to conduct an investigation and inspec-
tion of the accounting records of the Moab Na-
tional Bank. And was at that time made aware 
of the fact that one of the purposes of the in-
spection and investigation of the records was 
by reason of it having been determined that a 
loan in the amount of sixty thousand dollars 
had been made to Ralph Osborne, one of the 
executive officers of the :Moab National Bank 
by the First National Bank in Grand Junction 
in June of 1969. That as a result of :Mrs. Dohse's 
investigation and inspection of the accounting 
records of the .Moab National Bank she dis-
covered the various credit and debit entrys and 
the credit and debit tickets about which refer-
ence has already been made. That during the 
course of her inspection of said records and 
upon discovering an entry to the credit of the 
time certificate of deposit account in the amount 
of forty-five thousand dollars on June 9, 1969, 
she examined the records of the bank to find 
a corresponding debit entry in the certificate of 
deposit ledger sheet to offset the credit entry. 
She was unable to do so. That accordingly the 
witness would testify that she examined all of 
the carbon copies retained by the Moab National 
Bank of all certificates of deposit issued by the 
Moab National Bank from the first day it opened 
its doors to the 9th day of June 1969, that a 
carbon copy is made and at that time consti-
tuted the record of the issuance of the time 
certificates of deposit by the bank. That the 
time certificates of deposit issued by the bank 
are numbered in numerical sequence. That as a 
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result of her examination of these carbon copies, 
she discovered that there were no carbon copies 
of record for time certificates of deposit No. 
179, 129 and 75. She would further testify that 
subsequent to June IO, 1969 each of said original 
certificates of deposit bearing those numbers were, 
was redeemed by the Moab National Bank. And 
she now has in her possession those certificates of 
deposit. Now do we have copies of those here 
also? That as appears from the face of each of 
those savings certificates, certificate of deposit 
No. 129 was in the face amount of fifteen thou-
sand dollars. And was redeemed by the Moab 
National Bank from the owner thereof, Anna 
Marie Carter on June 26, 1969. That thereafter 
certificate of deposit No. 179-(R ll6) 
"MR. JENSEN: Twenty-nine. 
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: Seventy-nine. 
"MR. JENSEN: The first one? 
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: The first was twentv· 
nine. Seventy-nine the second one. Thereaft~r 
certificate of deposit No. 179 in the face amount 
of ten thousand dollars was redeemed by the 
Moab National Bank from the owner thereof, 
Yam pa Valley Electric Association. That cer· 
tificate of deposit No. 7 5 was in the face amount 
of twenty thousand dollars and redeemed by the 
Moab National Bank from the owner, San Miguel 
Power Association, Inc. Just I-n-c. On the 4th 
day of November, 1969. 
"l\'1R. JENSEN: 'Vhen was the Yampa 
Valley? 
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: I don't have that 
date. I don't know. Do you have that date? It 
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was simply renewed and not redeemed. That 
also included among the books and records of 
the Moab National Bank are three cashier's 
checks. Could we have those checks here. 
(Counsel now confers with a lady in the audi-
ence believed by the reporter to be .Mrs. Dohse.) 
( R 117) 
".MR. SAPERSTEIN: Three cashier's 
checks numbers 23058, 23059 and 23061. In the 
amount of five thousand dollars each payable 
to Ralph Osborne issued, each of which was 
issued on the 10th day of June 1969 and signed 
by Ralph Osborne in behalf of the Moab Na-
tional Bank. That these cashier's checks were 
redeemed by the Moab National Bank without 
endorsement on June 23, 1969. June 23, 1969. 
And July 14, 1969, respectively. 
"MR. ANDERSON: What was the date of 
those again? 
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: The first two that 
I gave you of 58 and 59 were redeemed on June 
23. 
"MR. ANDERSON: I mean the date of the 
checks. 
":MR. SAPERSTEIN: J uue 10, all of them. 
Number 61 was redeemed on July 14. That is 
correct is it not? 
(Lady sitting in the audience: Yes it is.) 
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: Mrs. Dohse, perhaps 
you could come forward if you would. You have 
enclosed an additional item here. Could you ex-
plain what these are. 
(Counsel confers with Mrs. Dohse.) 
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"_MR. SAPERSTEIN: That Mrs. Dohse 
would further testify that each of the persons 
previously named purchased their respective 
time certificates of deposit, the funds rather than 
have been noted as a debit entry to the time cer-
tificate of deposit were otherwise diverted and 
that she has in her possession registered copies 
of the various cashier's checks, all of which are 
signed by Ralph Osborne showing where said 
funds were diverted. That is, I shouldn't say 
showing where said funds were diverted, but 
rather showing or representing the funds that 
were not credited to the time certificate of de-
posit ledger. That would conclude her testi-
mony, Your Honor, and as part of the offer 
of proof I would, of course, offer as an appellate 
exhibit exemplified copy of the indictment in 
the case of the United States of America versus 
Ralph Osborne. Whereunder there are three 
counts of embezzlement relating specifically to 
each of the cashiers checks. I should say each 
of the time certificates of deposit previously 
mentioned, together with an exemplified copy 
of the minute entry reflecting the plea of guilty 
thereto, and would ask that also be made a part 
of the record as an appellate exhibit. (R 118) 
"MR. JENSEN: You probably better mark 
them. 
"_MR. SAPERSTEIN: "Mr.Jensen, do you 
have any objection, although this is not part of 
Mrs. Dohse's testimony, included among the 
documents they turned over to me was a general 
ledger sheet. This is from the First National 
Bank in Grand Junction and reflects the sixty 
thousand dollar-
"MR. JENSEN: Here? 
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"MR. SAPERSTEIN: Yes. 
"MR. JENSEN: No, I have no objection. 
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: To Ralph Osborne. 
I am wondering if perhaps in order to expedite 
things we could make these all appellate ex-
hibits and maybe number them after the con-
clusion of the hearing today? 
"THE COURT: Yes, let's do that. 
"MR. JENSEN: Yes. 
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: That concludes my 
offer of proof, Your Honor. 
"THE COURT. Do counsel, since l\!lrs. Dohse 
is here, do counsel want to ascertain whether 
or not that would be her testimony if she were 
to testify? 
"MR. JENSEN: I think the record would 
indicate that Mrs. Dohse nodded in the affirma-
tive that would be her testimony, is that correct, 
Mrs. Dohse? 
"MRS. DOHSE: Yes, that's right. (R II9) 
"THE COURT: And do counsel have any 
objection to the, to having her testimony as 
counsel has testified she would and as she has 
stated she would if she were to take the stand, 
do you have any objection to this testimony? I 
mean this is on the record, there is nothing to 
show yet that you have objected to this testimony. 
"MR. JENSEN: Yes, we objected to the 
offer. 'Ve objected yesterday to this testimony, 
and it was agreed that it come in as an offer of 
proof. 
"THE COURT: I didn't recall a specific ob-
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jection to .. Mrs. Dohse's purported testlinonr 
I see. " 
"MR. JENSEN: That's right. 
"THE COURT: Very well. 
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: Your Honor, just 
for the record, she was the only witness that I in. 
tended to call to prove the matter to be discussed, 
that we discussed yesterday. Perhaps I didn't 
mention her by name at the time. 
"MR. ANDERSON: So the objection we 
made yesterday would apply here to this offer. 
"THE COURT: To this testimony, very well. 
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: And that objection 
was sustained and that is the reason for the offer 
made. 
"THE COURT: I beg your pardon. 
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: And that objection 
was sustained, and that is the reason for the offer 
of proof just made. 
"THE COURT: Very well. 
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: That is correct is it 
not, Mr. Jensen? 
"MR. JENSEN: Yes." (R. II9-I20) 
2. Off er of proof relative to conversation of Wil-
liam S. May with Osborne. 
Counsel for defendant Hudson made the following 
off er of proof by way of questions put by him to Wil-
liam S. May, in the absence of the jury, with reference to 
a conversation he had with defendant Osborne in April, 
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1970. The questions and .Mr. :May's answers were as fol-
lows: 
"Q. Now, .Mr. May, inviting your attention to 
the month of May, sometime in the month of May 
or perhaps April of 1970, did you at that time 
have a conversation with Ralph Osborne? 
"A. There were numerous conversations I had 
with Ralph. One we were discussing was, pri-
mary concern was right at the time we were 
being examined by the bank examiners and after 
he come out of the board meeting we were sitting 
in the coffee lounge having a cup of coffee. 
"Q. Who else was present? 
"A. No one. Myself and Mr. Osborne. The 
statement he made at that time was to the effect, 
well I might as well tell you about it, you'll know 
about it anyway. I asked him what he meant, 
and he said there was an unlisted loan at the 
First National Bank in the amount of sixty 
thousand dollars. 
"Q. First National Bank of what? 
"A. First National Bank of Grand Junction. 
And I never thought too much about it one way 
or another, and I asked him how the loan came 
about and he said that Jim Hudson guaranteed 
the loan. And he said, that I finally was able to 
hang one in him. I've been laying for him for 
some time and I finally got the chance to do it. 
And that was about the exrent of the conversa-
tion that afternoon. 
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: I would tender that 
also, if Your Honor please, as being a declara-
tion against interest. 
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"TIIE COURT: I have serious doubt about 
that one. 
"lVIR. JENSEN: \Vell, I would object to it 
on the ground that it is not a declaration against 
interest, it is not material. That it is hearsay. 
(R. 108) 
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: If Your Honor 
please, the statement is that, I think you said, 
hang one on him, I think you told me, laying 
for him. 
"l\IR. JENSEN: Hang one in him. Do you 
remember? 
"Q. Do you remember what the words were! 
"A. No, I cannot, it happened so long ago. 
But that is the substance of it, but they are my 
words." (R. 109) 
The Court sustained the objection on the ground 
that "it isn't a declaration against interest, it seems to me 
it is a declaration in his interest" and the further ground 
that "it is very vague and susceptible it appears to the 
Court to many interpretations. Whether he meant he got 
him to sign and hung one on him by getting him to sign 
the loan guaranty, or what he meant is very vague." (R. 
no) After a recess the Court amplified his ruling as 
follows: 
"THE COURT: Well, I might just take one 
or two moments here and amplify my ruling on 
the witness that was just excused. I had the court 
reporter again read his testimony and it was 
as I had remembered it. He starts it out by 
saying that Osborne told him that Hudson ~ad 
guaranteed the loan and he said I've been laymg 
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for him a long time, I finally got him. Now to 
clarify my ruling it is this. l contend that I don't 
know whether he meant that he, he said that he 
guaranteed the loan. I don't know whether he 
meant he guaranteed the loan, I can't pay it, he's 
going to have to pay it, that would be hanging one 
on him. He didnt use the words I practiced fraud 
on him to get him to sign or I hung one on him 
by getting him to sign or that he didn't know 
what he was signing. He pref aced it by saying 
he guaranteed the loan. I finally hung one on 
him. And I don't know what he meant by that 
remark, whether, you see, whether he meant he's 
going to have to pay it because I can't pay it. 
That would be hanging one on him, but I noted 
particularly and I had the reporter as I said 
read it over to me word for word again. He 
didn't say I hung one on him by getting him 
to sign it and he didn't know what he was doing, 
or practicing artifice on him by sleight of hand 
or some ruse. This is after he got him to sign 
he hung on him. To me it may mean that he is 
simply going to have to pay this. This is hanging 
one on him you see, so that is the reason that I 
ruled as I did. I wanted to clarify it. All right, 
when I said it was vague that's what I meant. 
* * * " (R. lll-ll2) 
3. Offer of Proof as to negligence of Mackley in 
failing to act as a reasonable, prudent banker in 
handling the loan to Osborne. 
Counsel for defendant Hudson offered the testi-
mony of Mr. John M. Chatelain, Senior Examiner for 
the Department of Financial Institutions of the State of 
Utah which supervises banks, credit institutions, finance 
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companies and savings and loan associations. The Cour! 
asked Mr. Saperstein to make his offer of proof by war 
of questions and answers out of the presence of the jur;. 
After qualifying the witness counsel asked the followinu 
0 
question starting at page 194 of the Record: 
"Q. Asswne, if you will, .Nir. Chatelain, the 
truthfulness of the following facts: That some. 
time durmg the month of May of 1969, Ralpn 
Osborne, who at that time was executive vice 
president of the Moab National Bank, callea 
James ,V. Mackley, who was at that time a loan 
officer and correspondent bank representative 
of the First National Bank in Grand Junction; 
that the call came to Mr .. Mackley at his bank 
office in Grand Junction, Colorado. Assume 
that the purpose of the call was to solicit and ' 
obtain a loan for the benefit of Mr. Osborne in 
the sum of sixty thousand dollars from the First 
National Bank in Grand Junction. That is a loan 
personally to Mr. Osborne. Assume that prior 
to that date and for a period going back several 
years, Mr. Osborne and his wife Norma had 
previously borrowed money from the First Na· 
tional Bank in Grand Junction and that on some 
of those earlier loans Mr. Mackley was the loan 
officer involved in approving and making the 
loans. Assume that those earlier loans were never 
for more than thirty-five hundred dollars. Assume 
that there were three such loans. One in the 
amount of approximately thirty-one or two hun· 
dred dollars. Another in the amount of thirty. 
one or two hundred dollars and one in the amount 
of thirty-five hundred dollars. Assume that each 
of thos~ loans were to be repaid in installments. 
(R. 194) Assume that those installments had 
been paid periodically in accordance with the 
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terms of those notes. Assume further that there 
had been additional borrowing by Ralph Osborne 
and his wife Norma from the First National 
Bank in Grand Junction on a short term non-
installment type note for a thousand dollars. That 
had been renewed from time to time and event-
ually paid in full. Assume that all of these things 
had been done and were paid prior to the con-
versation with Mackley by Osborne in May of 
1969. Assume further that as a result of the 
telephone call by Osborne to Mackley and during 
the course of the conversation between the two 
men that Mackley had requested, or that Osborne 
had suggested that he have a co-signer or a guar-
antor for the proposed loan that he was seeking 
to make from Mackley. That he advised Mack-
ley that the guarantor or co-signer was a man 
by the name of Jim L. Hudson. That Mackley 
had indicated to Osborne that his financial state-
ment that he had would not support that loan. 
That he did not have a financial statement cur-
rently in his files of Ralph Osborne and that he 
requesetd a financial sattement to be supplied 
on Jim L. Hudson. Assume that pursuant to 
the request by Mackley to Osborne, Osborne 
subsequently mailed to Mackley the financial 
statement that has been receiyed in evidence in 
this case as Defendants, excuse me, as Plain-
tiff's Exhibit No. 2 which you have examined. 
Assume that in reliance upori. that financial state-
ment :Mackley advised Osborne that the loan 
would be made. Assume that upon receipt of 
the financial statement Mackley sent a letter to 
Osborne, a copy of which is, has been admitted 
in this case as Defendants' Exhibit 28. Which 
you have read. Assume that at the time he sent 
Exhibit 28 to Osborne, Mackley enclosed with 
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that letter the promissory note, Plaintiff's Ex 
hibit a. ( R. 195) The financial statement thJt 
was received on the Defendant Jim L. Hudsou 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, was supplied Mackley b,: 
Osborne. Assume further that Mackley did n~t 
know Jim L. Hudson. That he had never hearo 
of him, and assume further that he did nothino 
to attempt to verify his financial responsibilit1: 
Assume that he attempted to call Jim L. Huds~n 
after receipt of the financial statement and be. 
fore disbursing the funds to Ralph Osborne. 
That he attempted a telephone call to Hudson 
to Moab, and assume that that telephone call wa) 
never completed. Assume that there was never 
any answer at the other end. Assume that Mack-
ley never spoke to anyone in connection with that 
telephone call. Assume further that Mackley at 
no time ever thereafter contacted Defendant 
Jim L. Hudson in any way. Assume that h~ 
subsequently in response to his letter received 
back in an envelope the promissory note Plain· 
tiff's Exhibit No. 3, a current financial state· 
ment of Ralph Osborne dated June 4, 1969. 
And which has been received as Defendants' 
Exhibit 26. And the loan guaranty agreement, 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. Assume that at the time 
of the receipt of the loan guaranty agreement 
the blanks where the words Colorado, and Grand 
Junction, Colorado appear were not filled in. 
And assume that other than that the loan guar· 
anty agreement was as it appears today. As· 
sume that there was no collateral or other se· 
curity for this loan other than if we could call 
it security, the alleged loan guaranty signed by 
Hudson. Assume that the funds were thereafter 
disbursed in accordance with the request of 
Osborne. That no part of those funds were dis· 
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bursed to t!1e Defendant Hudson. Assume that 
the distance between Moab, Utah, and Grand 
Junction, Colorado, is such that it can be driven 
in a motor vehicle in about two to two and a 
half hours. ( R. 196) Assume that James \V. 
Mackley had authority to make loans in the 
First National Bank of Grand Junction to the 
full lending authority of the bank up to two hun-
dred thousand dollars. Assume that he had that 
authority without the necessity of referring a 
loan to a loan committee or credit committee 
or any officer or body of the bank. Assume that 
the First National Bank in Grand Junction was 
a correspondent bank for the Moab National 
Bank. That in connection with his duties as cor-
respondent bank representative of the First Na-
tional Bank in Grand Junction that James W. 
Mackley had become acquainted with Ralph 
Osborne and had known him for some years. 
Assume that in his periodic visits to the Moab 
National Bank Mackley generally met with the 
Defendant, or excuse me, met with the said Ralph 
Osborne. Assume that the first time that Mack-
ley ever contacted and discussed this loan and 
guaranty with the Defendant Jim L. Hudson 
was on the 6th day of April, 1970. Assuming 
the truthfulness of all of those facts that I have 
just stated to you, Mr. Chatelain, do you have 
an opinion as to whether the conduct of Mackley 
in making that loan to Ralph Osborne was con-
duct of an ordinary prudent banker under those 
circumstances related? 
"A. I have an opinion. 
"Q. State your opinion. 
"A. I feel that he did not act in accordance 
with the conduct of completing a file in a pru-
dent manner in this particular assumed situation. 
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"Q .. l\Ir. Chatelain, assuming the truthfulne1, 
of all those facts that I have just stated to you 
do you have an opinion as to whether the condue: 
of Jam es ~r. Mackley in making the loan 1
1 
Ralph Osborne conformed with commercialJ1 
reasonable standards in the banking industn: 
(R. 197) . 
"A. I have. 
"Q. And what is your opinion? 
"A. That he did not conform to the reasonabh 
acceptable standard of commercial lending. · 
"Q. Mr. Chatelain, what, in your opinion. 
should James \V. Mackley have done in order !o 
have conformed-\Vell, first I will ask it tht 
way. In order to have acted as an ordinary pm 
dent banker would have acted under the circum-
stances? 
"MR. JENSEN: I think Hersch, maybe-
he has asked the hypothetical question, that ha1 
been answered and that ends it. 
"lVIR. SAPERSTEIN: No, no, I am making 
an off er of proof, I'm not going to argue any 
more. Let's just get it on the record. Would you 
answer that question? I assume that you are 
objecting to all of this? 
"MR. JENSEN: Sure. 
"A. \V ould you give me the question again1 
"Q. \Vhat should James W. Mackley hal'e 
done in making this loan to Ralph Osborne had 
he been at the time acting as an ordinary prudent 
banker? 
"A. A definite contact should have been made. 
with the, Mr. Hudson. Since the loan was ob· 
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viously going to be made on the basis of his 
guarantee. His file should have been complete, 
completely documented in writing showing that 
a contact had been made preferably in person, 
but had he made the contact and knew of his 
own certainty that he was talking to Mr. Hudson 
then backed it up by documentation such as a 
credit report in writing or a memorandum that 
contact had been made through the credit bureau. 
In other words, complete a file on this borrower 
since he was unknown to the bank. (R. 198). 
And since also that this amount was considerably 
in excess of what had been usually transacted 
or loans made to Mr. Osborne. 
"Q. If I were to put the question to you this 
way, l\fr.Chatelain, what should l\fr. Mackley 
have done prior to disbursing these funds to Os-
borne, if he had acted in accordance with com-
mercially reasonable standards of the banking 
industry would your answer be the same as it was? 
"A. The same. 
"_MR. SAPERSTEIN: I think that is our 
offer, Your Honor. As long as the jury is out-
I suppose l\lr. Chatelain may be excused. 
"MR. JENSEN: Yes.*** (R. 199) 
"THE COURT: I want to add the reason 
that the testimony of Mr. Chatelain was not 
received by the Court, I want to make a record 
on that. In that the Court feels that it is irrele-
vant as to whether or not prudent practice was 
followed with respect to the liability of the De-
fendant Hudson on the guaranty. The Court 
is of the opinion that if he were to rule that every 
time a banker acted imprudently or not reason-
ably in making a loan and had a guaranty that 
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that loan or guaranty would be questionable ano 
that would upset our whole commercial practice. 
If we are going to say now here is a guaranry 
or here is a co-signed note I wonder if the banker 
who made that loan or the loan officer acted pru· 
dently or reasonably? If he didn't, we have made, 
left a perfect defense for the defendant to come 
in and say the banker shouldn't have made that 
loan, therefore the co-signer or guarantor shoulo 
be released from his liability. And I don't think 
that is the issue here. I think the sole issue here 
is whether or not there was an imposition prac. 
ticed upon l\h. Hudson to get his signaturi 
to that loan guaranty agreement and whether 
the bank had notice thereof. You may call in 
the jury." (R. 201) 
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